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Billions of dollars have flooded new online marketplaces for trading private 
company stock. These marketplaces stand poised to become important, lasting 
features of the private company world as they provide a central meeting place for 
buyers and sellers and potentially increase the liquidity of private company stock. 
Increased liquidity is particularly important to investors in start-up companies, as 
these companies have faced longer periods of time before going public or being 
acquired. The new marketplaces also raise significant information issues, however, 
that threaten their legitimacy and efficiency. This Article is the first to examine 
these information issues—lack of information, asymmetric information, conflicts of 
interest, and insider trading—as well as possible solutions that would allow the 
markets to continue to evolve while promoting their integrity and investor protec-
tion goals. Specifically, the Article proposes establishing a minimum information 
requirement for secondary trading in private company stock and reexamining the 
thresholds for accredited investor status in order to ensure that market participants 
can fend for themselves without additional protections. The Article also examines 
potential responses to insider trading in these markets, arguing that a case exists for 
the SEC to take action in the private market context, since harm may be cognizable 
and the arguments for regulating insider trading are as strong in the private market 
arena as in the public.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A new generation of securities markets is emerging. Shares in private 
companies, previously regarded as an illiquid, out-of-reach asset class, are 
being traded on websites resembling stock markets. Hot demand for private 
shares of Facebook and other technology and social media companies has 
fueled the recent meteoric rise of these online markets. Their future may 
turn, however, on how policymakers and market participants deal with 
information issues in these markets, which to date have been largely 
unregulated. This Article is the first to examine these information issues 
and potential responses to them. 
The new online marketplaces for trading private company stock have 
arisen in the context of changing market patterns. Over the past decade, the 
number of start-up companies entering the capital markets through an 
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initial public offering (IPO) has significantly dropped relative to historical 
norms.1 Whereas from 1991 to 2000, nearly 2000 venture-backed companies 
went public, fewer than 500 did so from 2001 to 2010.2 In addition, the 
median age of companies at the time of their IPOs has increased.3 Partially 
in response to the decline in IPOs, Congress recently enacted the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act).4 Among other things, the JOBS 
Act created an “on-ramp” that reduces burdens on newly public companies, 
but these regulatory changes are recent and their effects remain to be seen.5 
With fewer companies going public, and with those that do staying pri-
vate longer than before, early start-up employees and venture capital firms 
(VCs) have experienced significantly longer waiting periods before gaining 
liquidity in private company stock. VCs are “institutional managers of risk 
capital” that support the growth of innovative companies.6 When a VC 
invests in a start-up company, the investment is essentially illiquid and of 
uncertain value until the company matures and reaches a liquidity event.7 
The liquidity event, typically achieved by the company’s acquisition or 
through an IPO, marks the payoff for the VC and its fund investors.8 
Likewise, employees and former employees in start-up companies have 
depended on the company reaching a liquidity event in order to cash in on 
stock earned as equity compensation.9 
Meanwhile, during this period of decline in the IPO market and increas-
ing liquidity concerns, outside interest in buying private company stock has 
surged.10 Certain high-profile private companies have grown quickly and 
 
1 See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2012 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N Y.B. 52 
fig.5.03 [hereinafter NVCA Y.B.], available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=257&Itemid=103 (tracking the number of IPOs each year from 
1985–2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id.  
4 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
5 It is currently unclear whether the Act will incentivize IPOs. Although it created an “on-
ramp” that eases disclosure, auditing, and other regulatory requirements for a new category known 
as “emerging growth” companies, id. §§ 101–108, it also raised the number of record holders that a 
private company may have before being forced to publicly report, id. §§ 501–502. For further 
discussion of the JOBS Act, see infra subsection I.A.2 and Part V. 
6 NVCA Y.B., supra note 1, at 7. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2012) 
(explaining that employees holding common shares in a start-up cannot redeem their shares at will). 
10 See, e.g., Jay Yarow, Are We Headed for Disaster with Private Stock Markets? We Talk to 
SharesPost CEO David Weir, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://www.businessinsider. 
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have offered the allure of potentially huge rewards when the company 
finally has an IPO.  
These factors have set the stage for a liquidity revolution in private 
company stock, ignited by new online platforms such as SecondMarket and 
SharesPost. These platforms act as intermediaries to facilitate private com-
pany stock trading, creating centralized meeting places for potential buyers 
and sellers and lowering transaction costs.11 Estimates of the size of this 
secondary market measure the total transaction volume in the billions.12 
The rapid growth of these markets suggests a potential solution to the 
liquidity issues in private company stock.13  
But these new secondary markets also pose significant information issues 
that have not yet been explored in the legal literature.14 As this Article 
explains, these issues include a lack of information about the private 
companies whose stock is being traded, information asymmetry between 
buyers and sellers, and undisclosed conflicts of interest among market 
participants. These information issues raise concerns about the accuracy of 
the stocks’ valuations and whether secondary investors in these markets can 
truly fend for themselves without additional securities laws protections. 
Further, concerns about insider trading hang over the community, as many 
of the selling shareholders are employees or former employees, and much of 
the material information about the companies is nonpublic.  
This Article makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it 
identifies and analyzes the information issues in the new online secondary 
markets. Such issues constitute some of the most critical concerns about 
these markets today. Second, the Article explores potential responses to 
these information issues. Specifically, the Article proposes establishing a 
minimum information requirement for trading in private company stock 
 
com/sharespost-interview-2011-3 (“Interest in the private markets for trading stock in hot startups 
is at an all time high.”). 
11 See infra Section I.B. 
12 See, e.g., Richard Teitelbaum, Facebook Drives SecondMarket Broking $1 Billion Private  
Shares, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-27/facebook-drives- 
secondmarket-broking-1-billion-private-shares.html (“The value of all private-share transactions was 
$4.6 billion in 2010, up from $2.4 billion in 2009 . . . .”). 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 4 (describing the secondary markets and arguing that 
they help to solve investor lock-in problems in the venture capital model); Jose Miguel Mendoza 
& Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The “New” Venture Capital Cycle (Part I): The Importance of Private 
Secondary Market Liquidity 14-15 (Lex Research Topics in Corp. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
1, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1829835 (arguing that liquidity gaps disrupt  
the venture capital cycle and that secondary marketplaces for private company stock help bridge 
these gaps). 
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and reexamining accredited investor thresholds to ensure that market 
participants can fend for themselves without additional protections. The 
Article also examines potential responses to insider trading in these 
markets, arguing that a case for the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) taking action exists, as harm may be cognizable and the arguments 
for regulating insider trading are as strong in the private market realm as in 
the public. Finally, the Article situates these contributions in a broader 
context by examining the underlying tension between these private second-
ary markets and public markets. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the ven-
ture capital cycle and the IPO market, as well as the securities law frame-
work in which the secondary marketplaces have grown. In addition, it 
details the rise of the secondary markets and their mechanics. Against that 
background, Part II discusses the potential benefits these markets offer. Part 
III analyzes the information issues in the secondary markets, including lack 
of information, asymmetric information, conflicts of interest, and insider 
trading. Part IV explores potential responses to these issues, with the aim of 
sparking a wider conversation. Finally, Part V deepens and contextualizes 
the analysis and potential responses to it by engaging with policy concerns 
about the public–private divide. 
I. SECONDARY MARKETS FOR PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK 
A. Background 
The secondary markets for private company stock have developed in the 
context of a changing venture capital and liquidity environment, and in a 
regulatory framework that was largely established long before regulators 
could have imagined the existence of online marketplaces. This Section 
briefly describes the venture capital cycle and the IPO market, as well as the 
securities law context in which the secondary marketplaces have grown. 
This background helps explain the business opportunity that the secondary 
marketplaces have seized and lays the groundwork for understanding the 
information issues in these markets that this Article explores. 
1. Venture Capital Cycle and Liquidity Environment 
The venture capital life cycle starts with the creation of funds that raise 
capital from institutional and private investors interested in start-up 
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companies.15 A venture capital fund is typically organized as a limited 
partnership with the VC as the general partner and the investors as the 
limited partners.16 The VC selects the portfolio companies for the fund, and 
nurtures and supports them by contributing money and often services or 
advice that the companies need in order to develop.17  
Venture capital funds generally have a defined period of existence, or 
“term,” and detailed rules about how investors in these funds can liquidate 
their assets in the funds at the end of that period.18 The goal is for the start-
up companies to achieve successful “exits” that make a significant return on 
investment for the venture capital fund. Indeed, venture capital fund 
liquidity depends on start-ups’ exits.19 The primary exit mechanisms for 
start-ups are going public and being acquired in a merger transaction 
(sometimes referred to as an “M&A exit”).20 While M&A exits are more 
common, industry insiders have long viewed IPOs as essential for sustain-
ing a robust venture capital industry because of their potential for high 
investor returns.21 
In the past decade, there have been significant declines in the number of 
companies listing on major U.S. stock exchanges and in the number of 
IPOs. These drops have posed substantial challenges for the venture capital 
 
15 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003). For an overview of the venture capital industry, see PAUL 
GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 1-32 (2d ed. 2004). 
16 Gilson, supra note 15, at 1071. 
17 Id. 
18 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock 
Market?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1999, at 36, 41 (discussing the standard limited partnership 
agreement and its effect on investors). 
19 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that venture capital “exhibit[s] investor lock-in”).  
20 D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 317 (2005).  
21 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 11 (“IPOs are the gold standard in VC success.”); ERNST & 
YOUNG, GLOBALIZING VENTURE CAPITAL 17, available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/Globalizing_venture_capital_Gloal_venture_capital_insights_and_trends_report_2011/ 
$FILE/Globalizing_venture_capital_Global_venture_capital_insights_and_trends_report_2011.pdf 
(“M&A makes up close to 90% of US VC-backed exits in the United States.”); Richard Smith et 
al., The Relative Importance of IPO and M&A Exits for Venture Capital Fund Financial 
Performance 3 & n.3 (Feb. 28, 2011) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://sites. 
kauffman.org/efic/resources/Venture-Capital-Fund-Financial-Performance.pdf (examining the view 
that “fund success is predominantly due to IPO exits” and noting that “IPO exit valuations tend to 
be materially higher than M&A exit valuations”). But see DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, GRANT 
THORNTON, MARKET STRUCTURE IS CAUSING THE IPO CRISIS—AND MORE 7 (2010), 
available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20companies%20and%20capital%20markets/ 
Files/IPO%20crisis%20-%20June%202010%20-%20FINAL.pdf (“[T]he exit workhorse of venture 
capital is now the sale of a portfolio company to mostly strategic (large corporate) acquirers.”). 
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cycle.22 The number of companies listed on the major U.S. stock exchanges 
reached its highest point at over 7000 in 1997 and has been declining since.23 
Currently, about 4000 companies are listed on major U.S. stock exchanges, 
and experts believe that the number may decrease further.24  
Part of this loss stems from a precipitous drop in the number of IPOs 
since the crash of the Internet bubble in 2000.25 In addition, changes in the 
public markets, such as the decimalization of stock quotes and the costs of 
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, may have raised the costs 
associated with being public and affected possible exit strategies for private 
firms.26 In particular, the demographics of small firm IPOs have shifted 
significantly—whereas IPOs raising less than $50 million once constituted 
more than 80% of IPOs, that number has fallen to just 20%.27 Further, the 
median age of companies at their time of IPO has increased in the past 
decade, to nearly ten years.28 The average time for venture-backed compa-
nies to reach an M&A exit has also lengthened, from 1.8 years in 2000 to 5.4 
 
22 See, e.g., NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, VENTURE CAPITAL 101: WHAT IS VENTURE 
CAPITAL? 9-10 (2008), available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman& 
task=doc_download&gid=357 (“[U]nless a company is acquired or goes public, there is little actual 
value.”). 
23 Felix Salmon, Op-Ed., Wall Street’s Dead End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at A27.  
24 Id. 
25 See NVCA Y.B., supra note 1, at 52 fig.5.03 (providing historical data on the number of 
venture-backed IPOs per year and showing that the number of IPOs in 2001 and later was a 
fraction of the number of IPOs through the 1990s); see also Graham Bowley, Fleeing to Foreign 
Shores, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2011, at B1 (noting that there were only 119 IPOs in the United States 
in 2010, compared with 756 in 1996, and discussing several reasons why some companies are going 
public abroad rather than in the United States). 
26 See Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the United States, 1 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369, 370 (2006) (noting that Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley has 
raised the costs associated with IPOs); see also WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 22 (discussing how 
decimalization constrained the trading of smaller companies’ stock); Francesco Bova et al., The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Exit Strategies of Private Firms 28 (May 5, 2011) (unnumbered working 
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract_id=1730242 (finding that Sarbanes-Oxley appears to 
have “shifted the distribution landscape from IPO to acquisitions”). 
27 GRANT THORNTON, HOPE FOR THE SMALL IPO MARKET? 1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Technology/Techdashboard/Grant%20Thornton%20-
%20Hope%20for%20the%20small%20IPO%20market%20FINAL.pdf. 
28 NVCA Y.B., supra note 1, at 52 fig.5.03; see also IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO 
ON-RAMP 6 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_ 
on-ramp.pdf (“The average age at IPO of companies going public between 1997 and 2001 was 
approximately five and a half years, compared with more than nine years for companies going 
public between 2006 and 2011.”). 
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years in 2010.29 Thus, in recent years, venture-backed private companies 
have taken longer to reach exit, and their exits are less often via IPO.  
The demand for liquidity in start-up company stock builds with this 
longer wait time. Most venture capital funds have terms of ten years or 
less,30 and VCs that hold private company stock may need to provide 
limited partners (the investors in a venture capital fund) with liquidity at 
the end of a fund’s life cycle. In addition, long-term (as well as former) 
employees in a start-up may have a lot of “paper wealth” from the value of 
their vested stock options, but not much cash to upgrade their lifestyles or 
diversify their investments.31 Furthermore, companies may have difficulty 
attracting talented employees in the first place if incentive stock options are 
not viewed as valuable.32 
The longer exit horizon for shareholders in private start-up companies 
has created what some scholars have identified as a “liquidity gap” in the 
venture capital cycle.33 Liquidity gaps are significant because of their 
potential for discouraging venture capital investment and entrepreneur-
ship—that is, the availability of a timely exit strategy can affect whether 
prospective investors will commit in the first place to contributing human 
and capital resources to a start-up.34  
 
29 Joseph Ghalbouni & Dominique Rouziès, The VC Shakeout, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 
2010, at 21, 22.  
30 DAN BURSTEIN & SAM SCHWERIN, MILLENNIUM TECH. VALUE PARTNERS, L.P., 
INSIDE THE GROWING SECONDARY MARKET FOR VENTURE CAPITAL ASSETS 6 (2008), 
available at http://mtvlp.com/files/resources/InsidetheGrowingSecondary.pdf; KEN SAWYER ET 
AL., SAINTS CAPITAL, A GUIDE TO SECONDARY TRANSACTIONS: ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO 
LIQUIDITY IN PRIVATE COMPANIES 6 (2010), available at http://www.saintscapital.com (click 
“Download Secondary Transaction Guide”).  
31 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 639, 642 (2009) (“Company founders value share liquidity because it allows them to 
easily diversify their portfolios.”). 
32 See Sean F. Reid et. al., The Valuation of Employee Stock Options Issued by Closely Held Firms, 
13 J. LEGAL ECON. 19, 23 (2006) (“Startup firms often lack adequate cash flow to pay competitive 
salaries for talented employees and executives. To lure these desirable employees and executives to 
the startup firm, as well as retain their services as the company matures, a lucrative ESO 
[employee stock option] package may be the most critical component of the compensation . . . .”). 
33 Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 14, at 3, 10. In this context, the term “liquidity gap” 
refers to the period of time before a company has an exit event and investors have liquidity in 
their investment. This period of time is much longer than it was in the 1990s. See supra text 
accompanying notes 28-29.  
34 See Industry Statistics Update: Is the Venture Capital Industry Experiencing a Capital Crisis?, 
NVCA TODAY (Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n), Sept. 7, 2008, available at http://nvcatoday.nvca. 
org/index.php/industry-statistics-update-is-the-venture-capital-industry-experiencing-a-capital-
crisis.html (positing that a decrease in the number of IPOs in 2008 had led to a drop in venture 
capital funding); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 15, at 345 (“The need to ultimately exit 
 
  
2012] Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0 187 
 
2. Securities Law Framework 
Another important foundation for understanding the rise of the private 
secondary markets is the existing securities law framework. Federal securi-
ties laws govern investment in private start-up companies and any subse-
quent sales of stock by the investor or other shareholders. In brief, when a 
company sells its stock, it must either register the stock with the SEC as a 
public offering or structure the offering as a private placement fitting within 
a specified securities law exemption.35 If the company goes the latter route, 
a registration exemption must again apply when any resale of that stock 
occurs.36 This resale, from an existing investor to a third party, is known as 
a “secondary transaction.”37 This Section briefly covers the relevant secu-
rities laws as they lay the groundwork for how the private secondary 
markets operate. 
a. Registration and Private Placements  
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) “to provide 
investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public 
offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, 
through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical 
standards of honesty and fair dealing.”38 The Securities Act provides that, 
unless otherwise exempt, all offers and sales of securities must be registered 
with the SEC.39 Registration under the Securities Act is costly. Issuers 
must file a registration with extensive disclosures and pay fees to the SEC 
as well as legal and accounting fees and expenses, stock exchange listing 
fees, and any underwriting compensation incurred.40 In addition to these 
 
investments shapes every aspect of the venture capital cycle, from the ability to raise capital to the 
types of investments that are made.”); WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 7 (“[T]he lack of an IPO 
market has caused venture capitalists to avoid financing some of the more far-reaching and risky 
ideas that have no obvious Fortune 500 buyer.”). 
35 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATIONS: THE ESSENTIALS 
297-98 (2008). 
36 Id. at 319. 
37 Id. at 13. 
38 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 
1-5 (1933)). 
39 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006). “Offer” and “sale” are interpreted broadly to include “every 
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security . . . .” Id. § 77b(a)(3); see 
also Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and 
the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 907 (2011) (noting the broad sweep of Section 5 of 
the Securities Act). 
40 Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 908. 
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registration expenses, the ongoing costs of being a public reporting company 
are high and include costs associated with ongoing reporting under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), regulatory compliance, 
and being in the public eye.41 
If a private company wishes to avoid registration, it must structure sales 
of its securities to fit within the safe harbor of an exemption. Exemptions 
are based on the general notion that registration safeguards are unnecessary 
for the adequate protection of investors and markets for certain limited 
offerings.42  
The primary statutory exemption for private placements is Section 4(2) 
of the Securities Act, which exempts “transactions by an issuer not involv-
ing any public offering.”43 The statute does not explicitly define “public 
offering.”44 In the seminal case on the topic, SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the 
Supreme Court clarified that the applicability of the exemption “should 
turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection 
of the [Securities] Act,” which is designed “to protect investors by promot-
ing full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment 
 
41 Id. at 910 n.147; see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 156 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing some of the indirect costs of an IPO). For “emerging 
growth companies” with less than $1 billion in total annual gross revenues, the JOBS Act reduced 
regulatory burdens associated with going public by creating a transitional on-ramp that phases in 
certain compliance measures over a period of time after the company’s IPO. JOBS Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-106, §§ 101–108, 126 Stat. 306, 307-13 (2012). Such measures include lowered requirements 
for audited financial statements at the time of IPO, limited executive compensation disclosure, 
phase-in periods for certain financial accounting standards, and exemptions from auditor 
attestations under Sarbanes-Oxley and “say-on-pay” votes. Id. §§ 102–104. The JOBS Act’s effect 
on the U.S. IPO market remains to be seen. See, e.g., Liz Gannes, How Will the JOBS Act Affect 
Tech IPOs?, ALLTHINGSD (Apr. 5, 2012, 10:39 AM PT), http://allthingsd.com/20120405/how-will-
the-jobs-act-affect-tech-ipos (“[T]he consensus from everyone I talked to is that the JOBS Act is 
more of a reducer of friction than a significant change to the incentives around going public.”). But 
see PHILLIP J. KARDIS II ET AL., K&L GATES, CAPITAL MARKETS RELIEF: JOBS ( JUMPSTART 
OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS) ACT EASES REGULATORY BARRIERS TO IPOS AND OTHER 
CAPITAL RAISING ALTERNATIVES 3 (2012), available at http://www.klgates.com/capital-markets-
relief-jobs-jumpstart-our-business-startups-act-eases-regulatory-barriers-to-ipos-and-other-capital-
raising-alternatives-04-05-2012 (expecting, as a result of the JOBS Act, “an increase in the number 
of small IPOs compared to the diminished levels of recent years”). 
42 Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 928; see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (noting 
the inefficiency of requiring registration “where there is no practical need for [application of the 
Securities Act] or where the public benefits are too remote”); C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisti-
cated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1133 (“As a historical matter, 
Congress did not design the securities laws to protect investors capable of protecting themselves.”). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). This Article refers to the securities laws in the customary manner to 
date, with pre–JOBS Act numbering. 
44 Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 912. 
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decisions.”45 The Court thus reasoned that “[a]n offering to those who are 
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction not involving any 
public offering.”46  
Two factors help determine the ability to fend for oneself: (1) the offeree’s 
knowledge or sophistication in investment matters and (2) his access to 
information.47 In sum, sophisticated offerees with access to information 
similar to that provided in a registration statement would not need the 
protections of the Securities Act, and a transaction constituted of such 
offerees would not be a public offering.48 
Since Ralston Purina, the SEC has promulgated Regulation D49 to pro-
vide additional clarity in this area and to mitigate the uncertainty inherent 
in Section 4(2)’s private placement exemption.50 Regulation D includes 
Rule 506, which provides a safe harbor for offerings limited to “accredited 
investors.”51 Rule 501 defines “accredited investors” as specified institutional 
investors such as banks, and individuals with a net worth over $1 million or 
annual income over $200,000 (or $300,000 joint annual income) for the 
previous two years.52 Accredited status is thus a proxy for being able to fend 
for oneself, objectively determined by institutional identity, or the net 
worth or income of the individual investor.  
b. Exemptions for Resales  
Privately placed securities are not freely tradable, and any “secondary 
transaction” in which an existing shareholder sells to a third party must 
 
45 346 U.S. 119, 124, 125 (1953). 
46 Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 See id. at 125-27 (analyzing the investor’s access to information); Heminway & Hoffman, 
supra note 39, at 914 & n.173 (noting that courts have interpreted “sophistication” as the “financial 
and business knowledge that allows them to appreciate the risks of the investment”).  
48 Cf. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125-27. 
49 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–508 (2012). 
50 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 915 (highlighting the clarifying purpose of 
Regulation D). 
51 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). Rule 506 allows the issuer to include up to thirty-five unac-
credited investors as well, provided the issuer reasonably believes they are sophisticated—meaning 
the investor “has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is 
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,” either alone or with the 
assistance of a purchaser representative. Id. 
52 Id. § 230.501(a)(1)–(6). Congress recently amended the net worth requirement to exclude 
the value of the investor’s primary residence. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010); see also Net Worth 
Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793 (Dec. 29, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R.). 
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likewise be structured to fit within an available exemption from registration.53 
One of the most commonly relied-upon exemptions for secondary transac-
tions of private company stock is Rule 144, a safe harbor under Section 4(1) 
of the Securities Act, which exempts transactions “by any person other than 
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.”54 Rule 144 allows for the sale of restricted 
securities provided the seller has held them for a certain period of time—at 
least one year for nonreporting company stock.55 Rule 144A exempts resales 
of securities with no required holding period if the buyer is a “qualified 
institutional buyer” (QIB), which is an institution that in the aggregate 
owns and invests at least $100 million in securities of nonaffiliated entities.56 
Information requirements apply under Rule 144A as well as under Rule 144 
when the seller is an affiliate of the company whose stock is being sold.57 
Nonaffiliate sellers of private company stock are subject to a holding period, 
but are not subject to the information requirement under Rule 144.58 
Finally, the so-called “Section 4(1½)” exemption may exempt the resale of 
restricted securities in a transaction structured similarly to a private 
 
53 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d); see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity 
Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409, 418-20 (2008) (discussing the securities law framework for resale 
of privately placed securities). 
54 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (2006). If a seller meets the requirements of Rule 144, he or she will not 
be deemed an “underwriter” in connection with the resale of the restricted securities. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.144 (preliminary note). 
55 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii).  
56 Id. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i). 
57 See id. §§ 230.144(b)(2) & 230.144(c)(2) (requiring disclosure of information about a pri-
vate company issuer upon request, including a brief description of the company’s business, 
products, and services, as well as certain financial statements, as required in 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-
11(a)(5)); id. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (requiring an issuer that is not an Exchange Act reporting 
company, a foreign issuer exempt from reporting, or a foreign government, to provide certain 
information upon request, including a brief description of the company’s business, products, and 
services, as well as financial information for its two preceding fiscal years). Rule 144 defines 
“affiliate” as any “person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, 
or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer.” Id. § 230.144(a)(1). Rule 144 
does not define “control,” but Rule 405 of Regulation C establishes an identical definition of 
“affiliate” and defines “control” as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or 
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of 
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” Id. § 230.405. An individual’s status as an affiliate is a 
fact-specific inquiry, determined by considering relevant facts in accordance with Rule 405. An 
individual’s status as a director, officer, or 10% shareholder is relevant, but is only “one fact which 
must be taken into consideration.” American-Standard, SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 19628 
(Oct. 11, 1972). 
58 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(1)(ii); Revisions to Rules 144 and 145: A Small Entity Compliance 
Guide, SEC, (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rules144-145-secg.htm. 
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placement.59 Section 4(1½) extends the logic of Sections 4(1) and 4(2) to 
resales by non-issuers—that is, it exempts someone other than an issuer, 
underwriter, or dealer who sells to purchasers able to “fend for themselves” 
within the meaning of Ralston Purina.60 Although not expressly in the 
Securities Act or formally adopted by the SEC, Section 4(1½) has been 
recognized by the SEC in interpretive releases.61 
Considering the legal restrictions in total, “[t]he net effect . . . is that the 
restricted stock is less liquid or more costly to resell than freely tradable 
stock.”62 Buyers and sellers incur search and bargaining costs to identify 
potential transaction partners, as well as compliance and trade delay costs 
created by the exemption requirements.63 
c. The Record Holder Rule  
Finally, start-up companies may be concerned about resale of their stock 
because such sales can increase the number of shareholders on the company’s 
record. If a shareholder sells a partial stake, that one shareholder might 
become two or more. Thus, private companies may be concerned about 
eventually triggering registration requirements under Section 12(g) of the 
Exchange Act.64 Until April 2012, Section 12(g) provided that any company 
with total assets exceeding $10 million and a class of equity security “held of 
 
59 See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND 
DIRECTORS § 11:12 (2011); Carl W. Schneider, Section 4(1½)—Private Resales of Restricted or Control 
Securities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 504 (1988) (tracking the statutory origins of the exemption). 
Section 4(1½)’s name comes from the idea that it combines Section 4(1)’s exemption for 
“‘transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer’” with Section 4(2)’s 
exemption for “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.” Robert A. Prentice & 
Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sale of Business Doctrine: New Relief from Securities Regulation or a  
New Haven for Welshers?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 510 n.244 (1983). 
60 See JIM BARTOS, UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW 85 (3d ed. 2006) (“[T]he exemption 
is somewhere between Section 4(1) . . . and Section 4(2) . . . .”); see also supra notes 45-48 and 
accompanying text. 
61 See, e.g., Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6188, 19 SEC Docket 465, 
496 n.178 (Feb. 19, 1980) (explaining that the Section 4(1½) “hybrid exemption” is “clearly within 
[the] intended purpose” of the Securities Act); see also Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328, 1335 
n.6 (8th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the Section 4(1½) exemption as legitimate). 
62 Sjostrom, supra note 53, at 420. 
63 Id. at 422. 
64 For these registration requirements, see 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006), amended by JOBS Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 501–502 & 601, 126 Stat. 306, 325, 326 (2012). In addition to crossing the 
Section 12(g) threshold, a company also becomes subject to the Exchange Act by listing securities 
on a national securities exchange or by making a registered public offering under the Securities 
Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(a) & 78o(d). 
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record by five hundred or more . . . persons” must register such security 
under the Exchange Act.65  
This rule has had the practical effect of forcing some companies to be-
come public reporting companies earlier than they would otherwise choose. 
The classic example is Google, which reached the threshold in 2003 and 
went public in early 2004, stating, “by law, certain private companies must 
report as if they were public companies. The deadline imposed by this 
requirement accelerated our decision [to go public].”66 More recently, 
Facebook found itself in a similar position.67 
Congress added Section 12(g) to the Exchange Act in 1964 to protect 
investors by mandating disclosures from companies with “sufficiently active 
trading markets and public interest.”68 It was aimed at private trading that 
had grown in the over-the-counter market.69 Congress used company assets 
and the number of shareholders as a proxy, or guideline, for determining 
which companies should be required to publicly report.70 
While Congress has amended Section 12(g) over the years to raise the 
asset threshold,71 the original 500-record-holders threshold remained 
unchanged until the JOBS Act increased it to 2000, provided that no more 
than 499 of those holders are unaccredited investors.72 Further, the JOBS 
Act excludes from the increased limit those holders who obtained equity 
under the company’s equity compensation plans.73 The higher threshold 
 
65 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g). The measurement date for the threshold is the last day of the company’s 
fiscal year. Id. If it exceeds the threshold, the company has 120 days to register. Id. 
66 Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at iv (Apr. 29, 2004). 
67 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. ONLINE 43, 44 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/?p=1028 (noting that Facebook planned to 
surpass 499 owners in 2012, the year it went public). 
68 Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 23,407, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,369 ( July 
14, 1986). 
69 S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 1 (1963); Steven M. Davidoff, Facebook and the 500-Person Thresh-
old, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK ( Jan. 3, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/ 
03/facebook-and-the-500-person-threshold; see also H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 1 (1964) (reporting 
that Section 12(g) was intended to “extend to investors in certain over-the-counter securities the 
same protection now afforded to those in listed securities”). 
70 See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the 
Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 
18-21) (on file with author) (detailing the history of Section 12(g)). 
71 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006). The total assets threshold was originally $1 million in 1964, 
increased to $5 million in the 1980s, and increased to $10 million in 1996. Relief from Reporting by 
Small Issues, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37157, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,354 (May 9, 1996). 
72 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012). The Act refers to accredited 
status as a term defined by the SEC. Id. 
73 Id. § 502. 
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may give private companies more control over the timing of an IPO and 
may make them less sensitive to the effect of stock options and stock resales 
on the number of company record holders.74  
With this background on the venture capital cycle, the liquidity envi-
ronment in private company stock, and the relevant securities law frame-
work, the next Section turns to the private secondary markets. 
B. The Rise of the Secondary Markets and How They Work 
The combination of the lengthened period of time companies stay pri-
vate, securities law exemptions for the resale of restricted stock, and 
information technology has created a unique business opportunity. And 
new marketplaces for trading private shares have emerged to seize it. The 
two largest of these markets are SecondMarket and SharesPost.75  
These online markets, themselves private companies, are modernizing 
the secondary transaction process. While securities law exemptions allowing 
trades in private company stock have existed for a long time, SharesPost 
and SecondMarket have innovated by establishing online marketplaces for 
this trading, acting as intermediaries to facilitate trades between potential 
buyers and sellers. They have user-friendly websites that have been fueled 
by demand for pre-IPO stock in highly visible venture capital–backed 
companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Groupon, LinkedIn, and Zynga.76 
And the online platforms were designed with securities laws in mind77—
 
74 Cf. The JOBS Act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act)—What Does It Mean for Entrepreneurs?, 
COOLEY LLP (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.cooley.com/jobs-act-what-does-it-mean (“Because 
companies will be able to stay private longer, it is possible that we will see a larger, more robust 
market for secondary sales of shares of private companies. However, we expect many entrepre-
neurs and investors to continue to explore increasingly restrictive policies with respect to 
secondary sales of their companies’ securities, particularly on secondary exchanges.”). 
75 A handful of precursors and alternatives to SecondMarket and SharesPost exist. See gener-
ally WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 17 (listing various precursors such as the PORTAL Alliance 
and NYPPEX); see also Ben Popper, Gate Technologies Expands, Challenges SecondMarket’s Model, 
N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://www.observer.com/2011/02/gate-technologies-
expands-challenges-secondmarkets-model (describing newcomer Gate Technologies). HedgeBay, 
another secondary market, is a specialty service for hedge fund interests. HEDGEBAY TRADING, 
http://www.hedgebay.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).  
76 The companies “listed” on SecondMarket and SharesPost tend to be mature, venture-
backed companies. SharesPost describes the companies on its site as typically valued at $100 
million or more, having $10 million or more of annual revenue, and having been in business for 
five or more years. Frequently Asked Questions, SHARESPOST, https://www.sharespost.com/pages/ 
faqs (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter FAQ, SHARESPOST]. 
77 See Gennine Kelly, Private Exchanges in ‘Dialogue’ with SEC: President SharesPost, 
CNBC (Dec. 29, 2010, 3:20 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40842540/Private_Exchanges_ 
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requiring buyers to be QIBs or “accredited investors” and requiring sellers 
to have held their shares for at least a year before selling.78 The transaction 
process through these online platforms is customized, rather than standard-
ized and immediate as on public markets. Nonetheless, the very existence of 
a known marketplace may reduce transaction costs and foster network 
benefits as trading becomes easier and cheaper.79 
Sellers in these markets include entrepreneurs, employees, and former 
employees who hold start-up stock and want to diversify or generate cash 
for some other reason, as well as VCs and other early-stage investors who 
wish to fund other companies or return cash to limited partners.80 The 
marketplaces have reached out to potential sellers, and sellers are also 
finding the marketplaces on their own.81 Buyers in these markets typically 
include individuals, existing investors, late-stage VCs, hedge funds, private 
equity firms, and institutional investors.82  
This Section explains in more detail what these markets are, how they 
work, and how they have evolved in the short time since their inception. 
 
in_Dialogue_With_SEC_President_SharesPost (quoting SharesPost President Greg Brogger, who 
said that SharesPost has “taken all those same securities laws that have always protected investors 
buying private company securities and . . . wired them into a web interface”). 
78 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76; Legal, SHARESPOST, https://www.sharespost.com/ 
pages/legal (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).  
79 See infra Part II. “Network benefits” refers to the notion of goods or markets in which 
value is increased as others use the good or participate in the market. Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 772 (1995). See generally 
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 479 (1998). The private secondary markets become more useful or valuable to their users as 
others also trade because more buyers and sellers in the market increases liquidity.  
80 See SecondMarket’s Q1 2012 Private Company Report, SECONDMARKET (May 3, 2012), 
https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/reports/q1-2012-private-company-report [hereinafter Q1 
2012, SECONDMARKET] (listing sellers by type); SecondMarket’s 2011 Year End Private Company 
Report, SECONDMARKET ( Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/reports/ 
secondmarkets-2011-year-end-private-company-report [hereinafter 2011 Year End, SECONDMAR-
KET] (same); see also BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 2-3 (listing reasons why sellers 
may sell stock in the secondary markets). 
81 See Yarow, supra note 10 (reporting that SharesPost has approached and been approached 
by potential sellers). 
82 SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 10-11; 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80; 
Q1 2012, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80; see also Institutional Investor Survey Results, SECOND-
MARKET, https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/resource/institutional-investor-survey-results 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (reporting that “most investors with exposure to private companies have 
either directly transacted in the private stock secondary market or [have done so] through a 
secondary fund”). Just prior to the date of this publication, SecondMarket released third quarter 
data indicating that companies are engaging in share buy-back programs and that an increasing 
percentage of sellers are current employees. See Q3 2012 SecondMarket Report, SECONDMARKET 
(Nov. 9, 2012), https://www.secondmarket.com/education/reports/q3-2012-secondmarket-report. 
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This Section contributes to the sparse literature on these markets and lays 
the groundwork for subsequently exploring the beneficial role they may 
play in the venture capital cycle as well as the troubling information issues 
they raise. 
1. SecondMarket 
SecondMarket is a marketplace that matches buyers and sellers of alter-
native investments. Barry Silbert, a young investment-banker-turned-first-
time-entrepreneur, founded SecondMarket in 2004 with an initial focus on 
restricted securities in public companies.83 In 2008, the company started to 
grow significantly, developing an early version of its online platform and 
expanding to include other asset classes, including private company stock, 
which has since become a focal point of the site.84 In 2011, private stock 
trades increased 55% on the platform and totaled $558 million in transac-
tions.85 Over a billion dollars in private stock transactions have been 
completed through the site since its launch.86 It is registered as a broker-
dealer, a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), 
and as an “alternative trading system” (ATS) under Regulation ATS.87 
 
83 Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th 
Cong. 112 (2011) (statement of Barry E. Silbert, CEO, SecondMarket); see also Brad Stone, Silicon 
Valley Cashes Out Selling Private Shares, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 21, 2011), http:// 
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_18/b4226070179043.htm (recounting SecondMar-
ket’s origins as a firm called Restricted Stock Partners which sold illiquid securities). 
84 See A New Vision for Capital Markets, STAN. TECH. VENTURES PROGRAM ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP CORNER (Apr. 13, 2011), http://ecorner.stanford.edu/authorMaterialInfo.html? 
mid=2698, at 9:30-11:23 [hereinafter Silbert] (discussing SecondMarket’s shift in focus from 
restricted securities to additional asset classes); see also Company Overview, SECONDMARKET, 
http://www.secondmarket.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter About SecondMar-
ket] (charting the asset classes in SecondMarket’s history, including private venture-backed 
companies, private community banks, fixed income products, bankruptcy claims, and public 
equity); Teitelbaum, supra note 12 (detailing Barry Silbert’s leading role in the market for private 
company, social-media stock). 
85 Paul Sloan, SecondMarket: Private Stock Trades Jump 55% in 2011, CNET ( Jan. 19, 2012, 
10:30 AM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57361897-93/secondmarket-private-stock-
trades-jump-55-in-2011. 
86 See 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80. 
87 About SecondMarket, supra note 84. An “[a]lternative trading system” is defined as “any 
organization, association, person, group of persons, or system . . . [t]hat constitutes, maintains, or 
provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for 
otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock 
exchange . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)(1) (2012); see also id. § 240.3b-16(a) (defining “exchange”); 
Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 853-54 (2001) 
(discussing how Regulation ATS imposes minimal regulations on low-volume electronic trading 
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The average sale on SecondMarket is reportedly $2 million.88 Pre-IPO 
Facebook stock was the most actively traded security on the site in its first 
few years, and it remains to be seen how Facebook’s transition into a public 
company will affect the secondary trading marketplace.89  
SecondMarket claims to have over 100,000 participants, over 20,000 of 
whom have verified themselves as accredited investors.90 In 2011, about 27% 
of buyers were individuals and 73% were institutional investors.91 On the 
selling side, nearly 80% of sellers were former employees and 11% of sellers 
were current employees.92 
One of the key ways in which SecondMarket has evolved since its for-
mation is by moving to a model in which it significantly involves the issuer 
company.93 SecondMarket no longer simply connects buyers and sellers in a 
 
systems and does not subject them to the “rigors of registration as an exchange”); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and 
Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 37-42, 45-49 (1999) (comparing the economic roles 
played by ATSs and exchanges). 
88 Douglas MacMillan, Facebook, Zynga Impose Fees on Private Sales of Shares, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 11, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-21/linkedin-zynga-may-use-
stock-sale-limits-to-curb-preipo-value-inflation.html. 
89 See Maureen Farrell, Facebook IPO Shrinks Private Trading Market, CNNMONEY (Feb. 3, 
2012, 1:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/03/markets/facebook_second_market/index.htm 
(noting that the majority of the $1.1 billion of stock trades on SecondMarket was in Facebook stock 
and questioning SecondMarket’s prospects); Lee Spears, SecondMarket Acts to Offset Facebook Fees 
Selling Wine, Art, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-
17/secondmarket-acts-to-offset-facebook-fees-selling-wine (noting that commissions on Facebook 
trades may have generated almost a third of the company’s overall revenue); Teitelbaum, supra 
note 12 (noting Facebook stock accounted for 40% of all SecondMarket private company stock 
trades as of March 2011). 
90 See Comment Letter from Annemarie Tierney, General Counsel, SecondMarket, to SEC 
(May 25, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-16.pdf (discussing 
the buyer verification process for SecondMarket’s pool of individual and institutional investors). 
91 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80; Steven Russolillo, SecondMarket Brags 
About 2011 Results, But What Happens After Facebook Goes Public?, WALL ST. J. MARKETBEAT ( Jan. 
19, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/01/19/secondmarket-brags-about-2011-
results-but-what-happens-after-facebook-goes-public; see also Q1 2012, SECONDMARKET, supra 
note 80 (providing updated figures stating that 18.8% of buyers in the first quarter 2012 were 
individuals and 70.8% were asset managers, hedge funds, family offices, and mutual funds). 
92 Russolillo, supra note 91; see also 2011 Year End, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80; Q1 2012, 
SECONDMARKET, supra note 80 (providing updated data for the first quarter 2012). But see supra 
note 82. 
93 See Silbert, supra note 84, at 24:40, 32:25 (discussing how and why SecondMarket works 
directly with issuers); cf. Steven M. Davidoff, Private Markets Offer Valuable Service But Little 
Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/ 
22/private-markets-offer-valuable-service-but-little-disclosure (noting that SecondMarket changed 
its business model in 2010 to require issuers, except for Facebook, to post two years of audited 
financial information).  
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common marketplace as it did when it started. Rather, it now works with 
companies to develop “customized liquidity program[s]” for them to control 
the trading process.94 SecondMarket allows the issuer company to decide 
whether to approve trading, when to allow it, the types of sellers and 
investors eligible, how much stock can be traded, and how the share price is 
set (e.g., as a fixed-price tender, negotiated, or in a Dutch auction).95 
SecondMarket has also developed a tool that “lets private companies 
interact with potential investors” and track their interest.96 
Accredited investors can participate by completing a profile online, at 
which point they can access company profiles and submit statements indicat-
ing interest to buy or sell private shares.97 These investors will then receive 
notifications of pertinent investment opportunities, if available.98 Second-
Market typically charges a transaction fee between three and five percent, 
which varies depending on the type and complexity of the transaction.99  
 
94 Barry Silbert, Not All Markets Are Created Equal, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 28, 2012), 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/28/secondmarket-sec. This model perhaps responds to some 
companies’ reservations about secondary trading. See Stone, supra note 83 (discussing why some 
companies might not support participation in secondary markets and the restrictions some 
companies have imposed). 
95 For discussions of how SecondMarket works with private companies, see Kevin Kelleher, 
The SEC’s Challenge in the Secondary Market, CNNMONEY ( Jan. 4, 2011, 1:34 PM), http://tech. 
fortune.cnn.com/2011/01/04/the-secs-challenge-in-the-secondary-market; Private Company Secondary 
Market, SECONDMARKET, http://www.secondmarket.com/private-company (last visited Oct. 11, 
2012) [hereinafter Private Company, SECONDMARKET]; Evelyn M. Rusli, Beyond Facebook, 
SecondMarket Opens Its Doors to Thousands, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 10, 2011, 3:01 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/beyond-facebook-secondmarket-opens-its-doors-to-thousands; 
and Barry Silbert, Comment to SecondMarket: Why Wasn’t SecondMarket Part of the 
SharesPost/Secondary Market SEC Action Today?, QUORA (Mar. 15, 2012, 6:55 PM), http://www. 
quora.com/SecondMarket/Why-wasnt-Secondmarket-part-of-the-SharesPost-secondary-market-
SEC-action-today [hereinafter Silbert, SecondMarket]. 
96 Nitasha Tiku, The Future of SecondMarket in a World Without Private Facebook Shares,  
BETABEAT (Feb. 3, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://betabeat.com/2012/02/03/secondmarket-facebook-ipo-
barry-silbert-02032012.  
97 See Private Company, SECONDMARKET, supra note 95; Q1 2012, SECONDMARKET, supra note 80. 
98 Private Company, SECONDMARKET, supra note 95. 
99 See SecondMarket Admin, Post to SecondMarket Support: How Does SecondMarket Make 
Money?, SECONDMARKET (Dec. 6, 2010, 3:52 PM), http://support.secondmarket.com/entries/ 
351048-how-does-secondmarket-make-money (“SecondMarket will earn a fee based on the 
notional value of the transaction. The fee is determined on a case-by-case basis depending on 
many factors, including, but not limited, to [sic] the asset type, value of the asset, and complexity 
of the transaction.”); see also Kelleher, supra note 95 (“SecondMarket charges a transaction fee 
between 3% and 5% of the proceeds raised from all private equity transactions.”); Teitelbaum, supra 
note 12 (“SecondMarket could broker $1 billion in private-company shares in 2011, taking fees of 
from 3 to 5 percent on each trade.”). Other fee arrangements may exist as well. See Felix Salmon, 
SecondMarket’s Unnecessary Facebook Fund, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://blogs. 
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While trading in the private stock of consumer internet and social media 
companies has been a focal point of the site in recent years, SecondMarket 
continues to evolve. Companies beyond venture-backed companies, and in 
different industries, have started to participate on the platform.100 In 
addition, the company may start to facilitate primary market activity, 
“helping companies to sell shares directly to institutional investors as an 
alternative to venture capital.”101  
Commentators have reported varying levels of information disclosure on 
SecondMarket. While one news article reported that companies can disclose 
“[a]s much or as little as they want” and that “SecondMarket provides its 
customers only the financial data that firms are willing to provide,”102 
another article reported that SecondMarket “require[s] companies to 
provide two years of audited financials and other information to potential 
bidders” (with the exception of pre-IPO Facebook stock, for which no 
information requirement existed).103 In 2011, SecondMarket’s CEO stated 
that information standards have been evolving. By that time, SecondMarket 
required disclosure of financial statements, balance sheets, a capitalization 
table, and any risk factors if the seller was an insider such as a director, 
affiliate, or manager.104 But the CEO noted a “lower level of requirement” 
for sellers who were not insiders.105 To provide the private company 
information to potential investors, SecondMarket maintains password-
protected online “data rooms” where such investors can view posted 
documents.106 The company has also started to offer, and even to pay for, 
 
reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/03/20/secondmarkets-unnecessary-facebook-fund (noting that buyers 
of pre-IPO Facebook shares on SecondMarket paid a three percent fee at the time of purchase and 
a second three percent fee when they got the stock). 
100 See Kelleher, supra note 95 (“SecondMarket sees the secondary-transaction market grow-
ing beyond a niche as private companies in other industries like biotech or consulting start 
participating.”); Silbert, supra note 84, at 46:30 (discussing how SecondMarket is expanding its 
private company market beyond venture capital–backed companies). 
101 Kelleher, supra note 95. 
102 Teitelbaum, supra note 12. 
103 Davidoff, supra note 93; see also Barry Silbert, CEO of SecondMarket, NPR (May 11, 
2012), at 22:25–23:14, http://www.npr.org/2012/05/11/152523244/barry-silbert-ceo-of-secondmarket 
(noting that investors were willing to make certain investments, particularly in Facebook, with 
limited information). 
104 See Silbert, supra note 84, at 35:55–36:38 (discussing information disclosures on Second-
Market). 
105 Id. at 36:45. But see id. (“[W]e essentially encourage, and we will start requiring, companies 
to provide at the very least audited financials and a balance sheet.”). 
106 Kelleher, supra note 95; see also Secondary Market for Private Shares: Overview and Chal-
lenges, ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, STAN. U. (May 4, 2011), at 29:45, http:// 
 
  
2012] Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0 199 
 
analyst coverage of certain companies.107 It does not, however, publicly 
disclose historical pricing or valuation information from the site.108 
In addition, SecondMarket has integrated aspects of social media into its 
technology.109 Participants can create their own profiles that include 
information about their previous investments and investment interests.110 
They can also “add companies to their ‘watch lists,’” “create a network of 
‘trusted’ investors” on the platform, and receive updates on their invest-
ments and auctions.111 The updates currently include digests of publicly 
available information, such as news and filings.112 SecondMarket states that 
it also provides updates on “[n]ew investors and funding rounds.”113  
2. SharesPost 
SharesPost also focuses on the secondary trading of private company 
stock, and has expanded into facilitating primary offerings.114 Founded in 
2009 by Greg Brogger, an entrepreneur and former Silicon Valley securities 
lawyer, SharesPost claims to have more than 60,000 members115 and a 
 
rockcenter.stanford.edu/2011/05/04/secondary-market-for-private-shares-overview-and-challenges-2/ 
(featuring Annemarie Tierney of SecondMarket discussing its online data rooms). 
107 See Silbert, supra note 84, at 36:58 (discussing the evolution of SecondMarket’s analyst 
coverage). 
108 Silbert, SecondMarket, supra note 95. 
109 E.g., Silbert, supra note 84, at 24:15. 
110 Press Release, SecondMarket, SecondMarket Unveils Next Generation Investment 
Platform (Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/pressreleases/secondmarket-
unveils-next-generation-investment-platform. 
111 Id. 
112 See Rusli, supra note 95 (“SecondMarket will aggregate publicly available data, including 
filings, and encourage companies to submit additional financial information.”). 
113 Private Company, SECONDMARKET, supra note 95.  
114 See About Us, SHARESPOST, https://welcome.sharespost.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 
11, 2012) (stating SharesPost’s goals as making “the process of managing secondary liquidity and 
raising primary capital easier and more transparent”); see also, e.g., Deborah L. Cohen, Going 
Public, in Baby Steps, Using Secondary Markets, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/11/29/us-cohen-secondarymarkets-idUSTRE7AS1NV20111129 (discussing SharesPost’s 
completion of a primary transaction); Udayan Gupta, SharesPost Helps Raise $200 Million for 
TrueCar, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/ 
article.aspx?articleID=2904731 (detailing the same transaction).  
115 Press Release, SharesPost, SharesPost Solidifies Position as Leading Marketplace for 
Private Equities (Mar. 21, 2011), available for download at https://welcome.sharespost.com/news-
and-events/media-center (click “Next” as needed to reach press release date). The number of 
members appears to be growing over time. See Press Release, SharesPost, SharesPost’s “Market 
Cap Monday” Highlights Third-Party Research Reports on Leading Private Companies (Dec. 5, 
2011), available for download at https://welcome.sharespost.com/news-and-events/media-center? 
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listing of over 150 companies.116 It initially structured itself as an online 
“passive bulletin board,” allowing members to post offers to buy or sell 
shares but without direct involvement or facilitation by SharesPost itself.117 
Over time, though, its model has shifted toward a more active facilitation of 
secondary transactions—a move which spurred an SEC investigation into 
the company’s failure to register as a broker-dealer.118 SharesPost subse-
quently acquired a registered broker-dealer, registered as an alternative 
trading system, and settled the administrative proceeding with the SEC.119  
Unlike SecondMarket, SharesPost does not work closely with private 
companies. Instead, it retains more of a marketplace-type approach between 
buyers and sellers. The secondary transaction process on SharesPost begins 
when a seller works with a SharesPost “transaction specialist” to post an 
indication of interest to sell.120 If a buyer agrees to the terms of a seller’s 
posting, the buyer can use the SharesPost system to create a form of 
agreement for the transaction, which she then sends to the seller for 
electronic signature.121 The parties’ identities are not disclosed to each other 
 
page=1 (click “Next” as needed to reach press release date) (claiming “more than 83,000 
members”). 
116 Press Release, SharesPost, SharesPost Becomes Registered Broker-Dealer and Alternative 
Trading System (Mar. 14, 2012), available for download at https://welcome.sharespost.com/news-
and-events/media-center (click “Next” as needed to reach press release date). 
117 Yarow, supra note 10. “Passive bulletin board” is a nontechnical term for SharesPost’s 
initial structure. In organizing that structure, the company appears to have relied on a series of 
SEC advisory and interpretive positions concerning registration as a broker-dealer and a national 
securities exchange. Id. For examples of these no-action letters, see Oil-N-Gas, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2000 WL 1119244 ( June 8, 2000), OilOre.com, SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 546573 
(Apr. 21, 2000), Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 636094 
(Oct. 25, 1996), Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 422670 ( June 24, 
1996), and Spring Street Brewing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 899364 (Apr. 17, 1996).  
118 See SharesPost, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 66,594, 2012 WL 1029004, at *3-4 (SEC 
Mar. 14, 2012) (admin. order) (noting how SharesPost evolved from serving as a bulletin board for 
potential traders to an intermediary helping transactions move toward completion). 
119 Id. at *5. The SEC imposed an $80,000 sanction against SharesPost for violating Section 
15(a) of the Exchange Act by effecting securities transactions for the accounts of others without 
registering as a broker-dealer. Id.; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Charges from 
Investigation of Secondary Market Trading of Private Company Shares (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-43.htm [hereinafter SEC Press Release] (quoting Marc 
Fagel, Director of the SEC’s San Francisco Regional Office, as observing, “The newly emerging 
secondary marketplace for pre-IPO stock presents risk for even savvy investors . . . . Broker-dealer 
registration helps ensure those who effect securities transactions can be relied upon to understand 
and faithfully execute their obligations to customers and the markets. SharesPost skirted these 
important provisions”). 
120 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76. 
121 Id. 
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until both parties have signed the agreement.122 However, either party, by 
clicking a button to send an e-mail, may request the other party’s identity.123 
Once signed by both the buyer and seller, the agreement is considered 
binding.124 The buyer can also start the same back-and-forth process with a 
“post to buy” instead of “post to sell.”125  
SharesPost provides the fully executed agreement to the escrow agent, 
who assists the parties in navigating the issuer’s transfer process and 
processes the transaction.126 Restrictive agreements on the stock, such as 
rights of first refusal, can slow the transaction, but even in such circum-
stances closing often occurs within sixty days of providing formal notice to 
the company.127  
The minimum sales price for a transaction is $25,000,128 and the average 
trade is about $200,000.129 SharesPost charges a fee of three percent of the 
transaction or $5000, whichever is greater, as a commission for its “transac-
tion specialists,” who facilitate the process.130 The escrow agent charges a 
flat fee of $1,500 to each party.131  
As with SecondMarket, participation is a limited affair. Only SharesPost 
members with a password-protected account can participate.132 Registering 
as a member provides basic access to the site, and once a SharesPost broker 
 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. In addition to this basic process for buying and selling, SharesPost also offers auctions 
for interests in single-purpose funds designed to buy a particular private company stock. See 
SharesPost, Inc., supra note 118, at *4 (detailing SharesPost’s model whereby “buyers were bidding 
on interests in [a] fund and the fund would in turn purchase the stock”). 
126 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76. 
127 Id. When private companies issue stock, certain transfer restrictions or agreements are 
often included, such as rights of first refusal, that can limit the transferability of the stock. See 
CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS 
LAW 101-02 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the “right of first refusal” and “buy-sell agreements”); Stone, 
supra note 83 (describing how technology companies sometimes restrict the transferability of their 
stock); see also Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Issuer Choice in 
Trading Venues, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587, 606-09 (2005) (discussing the validity of share 
transfer restrictions). 
128 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76.  
129 Teitelbaum, supra note 12. In contrast, the average trade on SecondMarket is $1-2 million. Id. 
130 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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has confirmed that the member is qualified to invest, the individual or 
entity can access additional information and purchase stock.133  
Unlike SecondMarket, SharesPost does disclose historical data, includ-
ing previous transaction prices, on the site.134 In addition, SharesPost has 
collaborated with third-party analysts and commentators in an effort to 
increase the information available to market participants trying to deter-
mine stock valuations.135  
II. POTENTIAL BENEFICIAL ROLE OF SECONDARY MARKETS  
FOR PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK 
Despite their different approaches, the private secondary markets serve 
the same essential function: they make it easier and more efficient for 
buyers and sellers of private-company stock to find one another and 
transact. This intermediating or connecting function is powerful.  
 
133 See Evelyn M. Rusli, As S.E.C. Watches, Secondary Market Seeks Transparency, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 18, 2011, 2:59 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/as-s-e-c-watches-
secondary-market-seeks-transparency (“Prospective clients must . . . pass a multistep qualification 
process to ensure that they meet the financial requirements, including a net worth of at least $1 
million or an annual salary of at least $200,000 in the last two years.”); Yarow, supra note 10 
(quoting SharesPost CEO David Weir’s discussion of the company’s “multiple levels of 
security”). 
134 See Benefits of SharesPost for Individual Investors, SHARESPOST, https://welcome. 
sharespost.com/benefits-of-sharespost/for-investors/individual-investors (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) 
(indicating that members can view “historical trade data”); see also SharesPost Private Company 
Share Prices Now on Bloomberg, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=BPW:GR&sid=a950RzGIeA9A (announcing Bloomberg subscribers’ 
access to SharesPost’s “real-time pricing” for private companies and historical data, including 
prices paid and trending graphs). 
135 See Third-Party Research on SharesPost, SHARESPOST, https://welcome.sharespost.com/ 
features/sharespost-research (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Third-Party Research, 
SHARESPOST] (boasting “over 450 research reports from 11 third-party research providers”). The 
quantity of the third-party research provided by SharesPost appears to be growing steadily. See 
Rusli, supra note 133 (reporting 230 available research reports available as of March 2011). For a 
period of time, SharesPost provided an index tracking a small number of venture-backed private 
companies as a reference point for valuation. Brian Caulfield, SharesPost Launches Index, FORBES 
(Mar. 3, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/velocity/2010/03/03/sharespost-launches-
index (reporting SharesPost’s launch of “what it says is the first index to track the performance of 
venture-backed private companies”); see also Jay Gould, Buyer Beware: SharesPost Index Under 
Values LinkedIn by Billions, SECOND SHARES (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.secondshares.com/2010/ 
03/30/buyer-beware-sharespost-index-under-values-linkedin-by-billions (criticizing the SharesPost 
Index and noting that “providing incomplete and insufficient data when determining valuations is 
unprofessional at best, and potentially very dangerous to these potential buyers on their 
exchange”). 
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While shares in a private company have previously been transferable, 
notwithstanding certain contractual restrictions and the constraints of 
registration exemptions, in practice the market has been notably illiquid and 
ad hoc.136 Finding a buyer or seller has been difficult. Imagine a potential 
investor decides she wants to invest in a particular private company stock. 
Without inside connections, she has no way to know whether any share-
holders in that company are willing to sell or whether a seller may sell the 
stock within an available exemption from registration. These obstacles could 
prevent the transaction from occurring. SharesPost and SecondMarket 
provide centralized sites for buyers and sellers to overcome these obstacles 
and transact.  
In addition to reducing search costs, the private secondary markets may 
also lower the parties’ transaction costs in carrying out the trade. Before the 
rise of these platforms, it had been notoriously difficult for outsiders to 
value private company shares without extensive due diligence.137 While the 
platforms charge fees for their services, they lower transaction costs by 
providing some, albeit limited, information for valuing stock. For its part, 
SecondMarket has started involving the issuer companies in their transac-
tion process, which seems to have generally resulted in more disclosure.138 
SharesPost, on the other hand, provides information such as recent buy-sell 
bids, contract prices, and third-party research reports.139 Both also provide 
form agreements, electronic signature functions, escrow services, and 
assistance in navigating any issuer restrictions on the stock.140 These 
functions all serve to lower the cost of secondary transactions in private 
company stock.  
Thus, the secondary markets make it easier and more efficient for buyers 
and sellers to identify each other and transact. Moreover, as the secondary 
markets lower search and transaction costs, the network may grow, and the 
 
136 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 83 (describing secondary transactions before the new markets as 
“carefully negotiated affairs,” and quoting a Silicon Valley financier who stated they were “very 
occasional transactions . . . done the old-fashioned way . . . [by] earn[ing] the respect and trust of 
the company”). 
137 Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 21-22. 
138 See supra notes 93-95, 105, and accompanying text. 
139 See supra 134-35 and accompanying text. 
140 FAQ, SHARESPOST, supra note 76; Private Company, SECONDMARKET, supra note 95; see 
also SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 12 (“Most direct secondary transactions necessitate the 
waiving of rights or privileges by the company and existing investors, the executing of a stock 
transfer agreement with the company, and the adoption and adherence to existing operative 
documents by the new investor.”). 
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liquidity of private company stock may increase.141 Although the market 
remains relatively illiquid, the increase in liquidity of private company stock 
may benefit stockholders as well as start-up companies.142  
As for liquidity benefits to stockholders, the secondary markets provide an 
exit option at the individual level, rather than at the company level as with an 
acquisition or IPO. This individual exit option is particularly important 
because “[t]he ability to control exit is crucial to the venture capitalist’s 
business model,”143 and the venture capital industry has faced a declining IPO 
market and longer average time before a company is acquired or goes 
public.144 Furthermore, employees in start-up companies have also faced 
difficulty with illiquidity, as few people want to wait ten years or more be-
fore being able to cash in on stock options awarded as incentive compensation.  
Increased liquidity for stockholders may in turn create ex ante benefits 
for start-up companies. With more exit opportunities, investors may be less 
inclined to price an “illiquidity premium” into their potential invest-
ments.145 This may lead to more start-ups receiving funding than might 
otherwise occur without the secondary markets.146 “By offering a market 
price and exit transaction at any stage . . . the secondary market can help 
promote allocation to venture in the first place.”147 
 
141 It is worth underscoring that increased liquidity does not necessarily mean a great deal of 
liquidity. There were only 689 transactions of Facebook stock on SecondMarket between 2008 
and early 2012, and it was one of the most heavily traded stocks on the site. Felix Salmon, How to 
Make $50 Million Trading Facebook Shares, REUTERS (May 18, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/ 
felix-salmon/2012/05/18/how-to-make-250-million-trading-facebook-shares. Moreover, tertiary 
trades are uncommon. See Felix Salmon, How SecondMarket Works, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/04/12/how-secondmarket-works (reporting “maybe half 
a dozen instances” of tertiary trades). 
142 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 21 (“The increased liquidity offered by the [secondary] 
market has both ex post benefits for individual investors looking to sell and ex ante benefits for 
nascent start-ups that need funding.”); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider 
Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1231 n.8 (2001) 
(“A securities market is liquid when investors can buy or sell shares on very short notice.” (citing 
JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 7 (1991))). 
143 Smith, supra note 20, at 316; see also supra Section I.A. 
144 The secondary markets could be particularly useful for “angel investors” who may tend to 
have more concentrated portfolios than VCs. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling 
Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1424 (2008) (discussing research suggesting 
angel investors tend to be less diversified in investments than venture capitalists). “Angel 
investors are wealthy individuals who personally finance the same high-risk, high-growth start-ups 
as venture capitalists but at an earlier stage.” Id. at 1406. 
145 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 22-23 (explaining that venture capital investors demand a 
higher rate of return on illiquid investments, which in turns makes investment less likely). 
146 See id. at 23-24.  
147 BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 8. 
  
2012] Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0 205 
 
The secondary markets may provide additional benefits beyond in-
creased liquidity. In the other scholarly article published to date on the 
secondary markets, Darian Ibrahim explored their beneficial role in the 
start-up and venture capital environment, specifically identifying improved 
corporate governance benefits as well as greater liquidity.148 Ibrahim argues 
that entrepreneurs and VCs can use the threat of a secondary market exit to 
reduce each other’s opportunistic conduct in the management of the firm.149 
Further, he argues that the secondary markets can mitigate conflicts 
between VCs and entrepreneurs over traditional exits.150 That is, the 
secondary markets provide a “release valve” that allows the party seeking an 
early exit to sell her stake separately and avoid forcing the start-up as a 
whole into a suboptimal exit.151 These potential benefits come, however, 
with a host of concerns that the next Part explores. 
III. INFORMATION ISSUES IN THE SECONDARY MARKETS  
FOR PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK 
Regulators have begun to examine the secondary markets and to debate 
whether they should encourage these markets by loosening the legal 
strictures constraining their growth, or, conversely, whether they should 
 
148 See generally Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 24-27. See also Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 
14, at 16 (“Without sufficiently clear options to exit from portfolio firms, it would be difficult to 
align the interests of the entrepreneurs and those who invest in a company during the different 
stages of its development.”).  
149 Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 26; see also BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 7 (observ-
ing that “investors and management teams are increasingly viewing the secondary market as a 
method to provide liquidity to help solve a wide range of issues, from employee motivation to 
litigation and severance situations”). 
150 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 29 (“The party seeking the early exit can sell in the direct 
market . . . .”); BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 7-8 (noting that secondary markets may 
give venture capital firms greater ability to manage venture capital assets in a portfolio, such as by 
adjusting their risk and return in a fund, or achieving partial liquidity on some of their invest-
ments before a traditional exit for a portfolio company). 
151 Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 29. This potential benefit may come with the corresponding 
concerns, however, that allowing employees to sell their stock lowers their incentives to exert 
effort in the company, and that allowing VCs to exit may lead to less vigorous monitoring. See 
Stone, supra note 83 (“Now some founders and employees are motivated to leave before the IPO 
because they are free to cash out . . . .”); cf. Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to 
Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform 24 (Apr. 6, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro-issa-letter-040611.pdf [hereinafter Schapiro] 
(noting that outside investors cannot monitor private companies like public companies because of 
limited disclosure and that VCs are by contrast “value-added investors”). 
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regulate these marketplaces more strictly.152 The potential benefits discussed 
in Part II suggest that the secondary markets should be encouraged, because 
they increase liquidity and may foster the venture capital cycle, which 
contributes to innovation and economic growth.153 
But to focus only on the markets’ potential benefits leaves significant 
issues unexplored. Specifically, concern has been rising about the lack of 
information and the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers in 
the secondary markets. This apprehension relates to both the quality and 
amount of information being disclosed.154 Underlying these concerns is the 
larger worry that without an adequate amount of accurate information, 
private company stock cannot be properly valued.155 Furthermore, the 
concern about asymmetric information raises questions about the related 
issue of insider trading. 
Imperfect or asymmetric information is, of course, a common issue in 
contracting.156 In some cases the law intervenes, and in some it does not. 
Public securities laws provide an example of regulatory intervention. In 
many contexts, though, parties can address information issues on their own 
through contract, or they can agree to a price that reflects the uncertainty 
surrounding their contract.157 Thus, the decision of whether to regulate 
 
152 See Schapiro, supra note 151, at 21-22 (“Trading that develops on online trading plat-
forms . . . can provide much desired liquidity to investors, which can assist in attracting investors 
to smaller private companies. This benefit, however, must be balanced with investor protection 
concerns . . . .”). 
153 See Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 36, 47 (noting that the markets “must continue to develop for 
their benefits to be fully realized” and that “[g]iven the surplus that entrepreneurial activity 
produces for society, VC secondary markets should be . . . encouraged by policymakers”).  
154 See Schapiro, supra note 151, at 22 (discussing the “lack of information available to investors”). 
155 For a discussion of why inaccurate stock prices may be undesirable in the public securities 
context, see Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 977 (1992). But see Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 186-89 
(2010) (arguing that share-price accuracy as a theory of regulation lacks an “intellectual core”). 
156 For classic literature in economics and contract theory on imperfect information and 
information asymmetry, see generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Michael Rothschild & Joseph 
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on 
the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979); and 
Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973). 
157 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 15, at 1076 (“All financial contracts respond to three central 
problems: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of agency costs.”); 
Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005, 2007 
(1987) (“Parties enter into continuing contractual relationships in order to exploit the economic 
benefits of long-term planning and coordination. Even so, contingencies may later materialize and 
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requires an analysis of the information issues that exist in the private 
secondary markets and a determination whether the markets and parties are 
equipped to respond well to these issues without regulatory intervention.  
To that end, this Part first examines the issues of lack of information, 
asymmetric information, and conflicts of interest, and then turns to 
insider trading. 
A. Lack of Information, Asymmetric Information, and Conflicts of Interest 
The starting point for the information issues in the private secondary 
markets is that, by nature, generally less information is publicly available 
about private companies than public ones because private companies do not 
have public disclosure obligations.158 Private companies are often hesitant to 
disclose information, and for good reason—their competitors can benefit by 
knowing their business plans and financial information.159 It is accordingly 
common for employees, consultants, and stockholders of private companies 
to be bound by confidentiality agreements as a condition of employment or 
share purchase. Further, many private companies are keen to avoid the 
greater scrutiny to which regulators and shareholders often subject public 
companies. 
In addition, the transactions on these marketplaces are secondary—
meaning that the company itself is not a party to the transaction and the 
seller is an existing shareholder. The company is not, as a general matter, 
obligated to disclose information to facilitate secondary transactions. The 
seller may not have significant information about the company, or may have 
signed a confidentiality agreement with the company and therefore may not 
be at liberty to disclose it. The Rule 144 exemption for resale of restricted 
stock does not impose an information disclosure requirement on non-
affiliate sellers.160  
As a result, unless the company or seller voluntarily discloses infor-
mation or it is otherwise available—such as in a third-party analyst report or 
publicly available information—the buyer may possess little information 
 
frustrate the parties’ efforts to realize these shared objectives. Anticipating this, contracting parties 
must distribute between themselves the risks of their enterprise.”). 
158 This Article focuses on information about U.S. private companies. Note that there are 
substantial differences in how other countries regulate disclosure by private companies. See, e.g., 
Benito Arruñada, Mandatory Accounting Disclosure by Small Private Companies 32 EUR. J.L. & 
ECON. 377, 378 (2011) (providing an overview of European Union practices, which require all 
private companies to register with a public registry). 
159 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 25.  
160 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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when deciding whether to purchase stock at the offered price. The buyer 
faces the risk that the stock will be valued at a lower price when the 
company eventually discloses information.  
The amount and quality of publicly available information about private 
companies varies widely. Some companies are relatively early-stage or have 
not attracted much attention, and consequently very little information 
about them is available. By contrast, a fairly substantial amount of infor-
mation may be available about mature, private companies in the public eye. 
Examples of such information include the company’s certificate of incorpo-
ration, which is a public document, and press releases regarding products, 
customers, or strategic partners.161  
Potential buyers might give weight to the reputation value of other 
known investors in a private company, such as well-respected venture 
capital firms. However, without a capitalization table or financing docu-
ments, it is difficult to know how large a stake an investor has in the 
company, at what stage it invested, and whether the investor has since sold 
part of its position. 
Some private companies are the subject of reporting on sites such as 
Second Shares and TechCrunch or more general media such as the Wall 
Street Journal and the New York Times.162 Deal term data may even be 
available in databases such as VC Experts.163  
The Internet, meanwhile, can also be a source of information, but that 
information can be strategically disclosed or unreliable.164 For instance, 
when Bloomberg recently cited Twitter insiders as the source of sales 
projections for the distant future, other commentators speculated that they 
might have released this information for public relations purposes or to 
“boost the reputation of Twitter to move some stock on private markets like 
 
161 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 19. 
162 See generally About, SECOND SHARES, http://www.secondshares.com/about (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2012); About TechCrunch, TECHCRUNCH, http://www.techcrunch.com/about (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2012). See also, e.g., Amir Efrati & Spencer E. Ante, Twitter Seeks $7 Billion Valuation, 
WALL ST. J., July 6, 2011, at B1 (reporting on the financing of Twitter, a private company); 
Thomas Kaplan, Facebook Announces 5-for-1 Stock Split, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 1, 2010, 3:37 
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/facebook-announces-5-to-1-stock-split (providing 
coverage of the financial maneuverings of Facebook when it was a private company). 
163 See About Us, VC EXPERTS, https://www.vcexperts.com/vce/about-us (last visited Oct. 11, 
2012) (“VC Experts provides specialized content on private equity & venture capital fundraising, 
valuations and deal term details on thousands of privately funded companies . . . .”). 
164 Cf. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded By The Light: Information Overload And Its Consequences For 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 475 & n.266 (2003) (noting that “the presentation of 
information . . . can be manipulated, for better or worse” and discussing the Internet as a source of 
information). 
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SharesPost and SecondMarket.”165 Moreover, one simply cannot find on the 
web all of the information that is typically considered key to properly 
valuing private company stock, including the “[r]ecent company capitaliza-
tion table[, c]orporate documents (charter, bylaws, and investment agree-
ments)[, h]istorical and projected financials of the company[, and] recent 
board presentations and/or minutes.”166 One secondary market investor 
explained he made investment decisions “going by gut,” which he described 
as saying to himself, “I like the product. I think the company’s doing well. 
The news that I read on TechCrunch or AllThingsD[igital] or any one of 
these technology blogs, it all looks good.”167 This investor noted that when 
electric car manufacturer Tesla went public he discovered that the company 
whose stock he had purchased had been losing money.168 He commented, 
“If I had actually known what the financials looked like, I would not have 
invested in Tesla.”169 
Third-party information, such as the research reports available on 
SharesPost,170 likewise varies in quality and amount. SharesPost offers over 
450 research reports from eleven third-party research providers.171 While 
this third-party research adds to the information available about a company’s 
stock, it is not a prospectus.172 Without comprehensive information from 
the company itself, third-party researchers likely have trouble providing 
robust valuation estimates. Furthermore, third-party researchers with 
undisclosed conflicts of interest might mislead potential market partici-
pants, a point discussed in more detail below. 
 
165 Erik Sherman, Is Twitter Leaking to the Media to Primp for IPO?, CBS NEWS ( June 4, 2012, 
5:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-57446882/is-twitter-leaking-to-the-media-to-
primp-for-ipo. 
166 SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 17. 
167 Ilya Marritz, Hunting for Hot Stocks, Some Investors Head to Private Markets, WNYC NEWS 
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/apr/30/hunting-hot-stocks-some-
investors-head-private-markets (alteration in original). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
171 See Third-Party Research, SHARESPOST, supra note 135 (listing available research reports). 
172 SharesPost subsidizes some of the research. See Third-Party Research, SHARESPOST, supra 
note 135 (“SharesPost is not the author of these reports but rather is only distributing research 
from a variety of independent sources. In some cases, SharesPost subsidizes the research presented 
on its platform.”). 
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In addition to providing third-party reports, SharesPost provides pric-
ing data about contracts that have been executed through its site,173 which 
increases transparency in the market to a degree. Indeed, SharesPost 
adopted this policy of posting trading histories, and having its brokers 
review price postings before they go live on the website, after significant 
efficiency flaws came to light.174 In January 2011, for example, some inves-
tors agreed to trade then-private Facebook stock for $60 a share, more than 
twice the price other investors paid that day.175 Efficiency flaws of this type 
may persist, however, particularly since SecondMarket does not post such 
trading history and the prices on the two markets may not always be the 
same.176  
More importantly, the trading history information, if available, may be 
of limited value if the other offers and transactions were also made without 
the information necessary to accurately price the stock. That is, the infor-
mation SharesPost discloses about offers and contracts may inform potential 
participants about market activity, but these transactions may not bear 
much relation to the company fundamentals if critical information is not 
available. Market participants who buy and sell stock without knowledge of 
underlying fundamentals may propagate stock mispricing.177  
Thus, the bottom line is that market participants may have little to no 
information of the type typically considered necessary for accurate pricing. 
Varying amounts of other information may be available, but it may be 
inaccurate and misleading. Further, it would seem that investors cannot rely 
 
173 Davidoff, supra note 93; SharesPost Media FAQ: 2012, SHARESPOST, https://welcome. 
sharespost.com (click “News and Events,” then click “Media Center,” then click “Download” 
under “SharesPost Media FAQ”) (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
174 See Teitelbaum, supra note 12 (calling trades of private company stock based on minimal 
data a “leap of faith”). 
175 Id. 
176 See id. (contrasting SecondMarket’s practice of non-posting with SharesPost’s); see also 
Pui-Wing Tam & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Hot Trade in Private Shares of Facebook, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
28, 2010, at A1 (noting that in December 2010, the average valuation of Facebook based on 
SharesPost transactions had risen about 25%, while Facebook’s valuation based on SecondMarket 
transactions had risen only about 12%). 
177 A variety of market participants have made this observation. See, e.g., Bo Brustkern, 
Response to Are Secondary Markets Helping to Overvalue Private Companies?, QUORA (Dec. 18, 
2010), http://www.quora.com/Are-secondary-markets-helping-to-overvalue-private-companies (“As a 
valuation expert, I believe that the majority of transactions taking place in today’s secondary 
markets are not reflective of Fair Value . . . I would say that a majority—if not an absolute union—
of my peers [who attended a Fair Value Forum meeting] are in agreement with me on that.”). 
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on efficiencies of the market for protection because stocks in these markets 
can be thinly traded and trades are not immediate.178 
 Adding to the concern about the sufficiency of information is the issue 
of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. Specifically, the 
concern is that investors and business insiders who have had access to 
information about the finances and direction of the company constitute one 
side of the market, while individual and institutional investors who do not 
have such access or knowledge constitute the other side.179  
The concern stems from the notion that in the world of venture capital–
backed companies, nearly every early investor and employee has access to 
inside information. That changes as the company grows, and there are 
certainly exceptions, but on the whole it is an aspect of the culture and 
economic dynamic of start-ups, particularly in Silicon Valley’s technology 
sector. VCs are known for providing “smart money”—they are not passive 
investors, but rather knowledgeable, savvy investors that actively try to help 
the company grow, with large investors often taking a seat on the board.180  
Meanwhile, buyers in secondary markets can be anyone meeting the 
accredited-investor or QIB standard.181 Hence, asymmetries can arise in 
many ways. A buyer might be a venture capital firm trying to increase its 
position, and the seller could be a former employee who was not, or is no 
longer, privy to company information. Or, perhaps more likely, the 
asymmetry could arise because the seller is someone with experience at the 
company, such as a current or former employee, and the buyer is an 
individual or institution with no such connection. Plus, the asymmetry is 
not always detectable. The buyer may not know the identity of the seller 
until after signing the purchase agreement.182 
A particular concern regarding asymmetric information is where a con-
flict of interest exists. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro recently acknowl-
edged this concern, stating, “In the absence of an informed market, 
 
178 Cf. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philo-
sophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1001 (“[T]he reasonable expectations investors 
have that they can rely on securities prices as approximating fundamental value is a cornerstone of 
securities market integrity.”). 
179 For a discussion of problems arising from informational asymmetries, see Stephen J. Choi, A 
Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45 (2004).  
180 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 15, at 1070-76 (providing an overview of the structure of 
American venture capital); Thomas F. Hellmann, Venture Capitalists: The Coaches of Silicon Valley, 
in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE 276, 276 (Chong-Moon Lee et al. eds., 2000) (explaining the role 
that venture capitalists play in the development of start-up companies). 
181 See supra notes 52 & 78 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
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concerns can be raised that pricing of securities may be influenced by 
conflicted market participants who may be buying and selling for their own 
account as well as facilitating transactions for other buyers and sellers.”183 
Because conflicts may go undisclosed, it is difficult to gauge the extent to 
which conflicted participants pervade the secondary markets. 
However, the media has reported on at least a handful of examples of 
conflicts of interest. Last year, Global Silicon Valley Partners posted a 
research note about then-private Facebook stock, valuing it at a signifi-
cantly lower price than the price at which its affiliate concurrently bought 
it.184 Another example includes investment firm GreenCrest Capital, 
which provides a research service that compiles financial reports on 
popular start-ups, while also offering single-company and blended funds of 
stock in the same private companies.185 The research service is “led by a 
team of former analysts at Wall Street firms [who] draw from publicly 
available information and interviews with the company’s investors, employ-
ees and industry experts.”186 GreenCrest takes only institutional investors as 
clients, and has pointed to that approach as mitigating the conflict of 
interest. “There is a conflict of interest to some extent—we do seek to do 
business with the companies we cover. However, our investors will keep 
that in mind before they make their investment decisions.”187 
Finally, tales of conflicts of interest abound in Silicon Valley, the geo-
graphic home of many of the start-up companies whose stock is traded on 
secondary markets. Legendary venture capitalist John Doerr of Kleiner 
Perkins is rumored to have once said “no conflict, no interest” in describing 
 
183 Schapiro, supra note 151, at 22. Earlier this year, the SEC filed charges against two managers 
of private company stock funds and their firms for engaging in improper self-dealing by charging 
investors undisclosed fees. See SEC Press Release, supra note 119 (announcing the charges); Sarah 
N. Lynch & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Charges SharesPost, Felix Over Pre-IPO Trading, REUTERS (Mar. 
14, 2012, 7:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/us-sec-sharespostidUSBRE82D1B420120314 
(discussing the SEC’s suits against Felix Investments and its manager, which is pending, and the 
SEC’s charges against EB Financial Group and its manager, which settled). 
184 Davidoff, supra note 93. Global Silicon Valley Partners, a research provider for private 
company valuation, published a research note with a valuation of Facebook around $52 billion 
while an affiliate purchased shares of the company at a valuation around $68 billion. Id. The 
affiliate later explained that the research provider is now defunct and the research was in fact 
outsourced and independently produced, and there was not an economic relationship between the 
research producer and the affiliate that bought the stock. Id. However, this explanation does not 
assuage the concern that an affiliate might pay or otherwise encourage research reports to suggest 
valuations that would put the affiliate in an advantageous position for buying or selling. 
185 See Rusli, supra note 133. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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his investment views.188 While such a statement may have been only rumor, 
Silicon Valley is a small world for some investors. Doerr sits on the board 
of Google, which is said to have made a “soft bid” to acquire Twitter in 
2010.189 In late 2010, Kleiner Perkins invested $150 million in Twitter.190 
Several months later, Doerr “raised eyebrows” with his participation in a 
Twitter board meeting as an “observer.”191 Around the time of its Twitter 
investment, Kleiner Perkins also reportedly invested in Groupon, another 
company that Google tried to acquire, and in Facebook, an emerging 
competitor to Google.192 
Perhaps responding to the perceived information problems, as noted in 
subsection I.B.1, SecondMarket has recently changed its model to require 
company approval for secondary transactions.193 In doing so, it has generally 
required that companies provide two years of financials as well as other 
information.194 One reason a company might agree to such disclosure is to 
exert some influence over the selection of secondary buyers. The company 
may not otherwise have specific rights to control the stock sale process, and 
managing “to whom and how the information is shared” allows the company 
to exert some influence.195 The company may not be concerned about the 
identity of the investor if the stake is small, but it may be a more significant 
consideration if the secondary buyer will acquire a significant voting 
position.196 Companies may wish to avoid having competitors become 
 
188 Henry Blodget, No Conflict, No Interest: John Doerr, Twitter, and the Rise of Secondary 
Private Markets, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 11, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-03-11/tech/ 
30001236_1_twitter-twitter-board-investment. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. Investors in venture capital–backed companies sometimes receive board “observation 
rights,” which give them the ability to sit in on board meetings and thereby get information about 
the company’s direction. Observation rights may exclude the observer from full participation in 
the board meeting, such as during the executive sessions. See id. (contextualizing Doerr’s role as a 
“board observer” at the Twitter board meetings); see also David Snow, Disparity Meets Liquidity, 
PRIVCAP (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.privcap.com/snowsnotes/2011/03/disparity-meets-liquidity 
(explaining that “[e]ven investors who have no board or executive role at the corporate level are 
often given board ‘observations rights,’ meaning the ability to sit in on board meetings”). 
192 See Blodget, supra note 188 (noting that Kleiner Perkins invested in companies that are 
potential partners or competitors of Google, where Doerr sits on the board of directors). 
193 Davidoff, supra note 93.  
194 Id. 
195 SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 30. 
196 See id. (explaining that the identity of secondary investors “should be an important con-
sideration if the secondary buyer will have a meaningful voting position amongst the shareholders 
or if they will play [a] role as a board member or observer”). 
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stockholders and to require that potential buyers sign a confidentiality or 
nondisclosure agreement with the company.197  
Companies may also be willing to disclose information for other reasons. 
They may have concerns about the accuracy of the pricing or about securing 
the best pricing for their stock.198 They may want to support private trading 
to provide some liquidity to shareholders or employees, or to manage their 
total number of shareholders so as to avoid triggering the Section 12(g) 
threshold that would require the company to go public.199 Finally, compa-
nies may wish to establish an insider trading policy and open limited 
trading windows with information disclosure, a point discussed in more 
detail below.  
However, companies may not want to disclose all of the information 
that SecondMarket recommends. As discussed at the outset of this Section, 
many private companies want to avoid disclosing information that would 
benefit their competitors, and they generally want to avoid greater scrutiny. 
Companies may still have other reasons for not wanting to facilitate trading 
in their stock, including concerns about liability and employee retention.200 
 
197 See id. at 25 (“Once a potential buyer has indicated a sufficient level of interest in the 
transaction, they will be willing to sign a confidentiality agreement with the company, at which 
point the company can share a more substantial amount of information.”). The company may also 
insist that the buyer sign and acknowledge that the information was provided “as a convenience” 
and have the selling stockholder “indemnify the company from any claim arising from the 
accuracy or incompleteness of the information provided.” Id. at 26.  
198 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 25 (describing the reservations that companies have 
about disclosing information to the secondary investor markets).  
199 See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. For example, by working with SecondMar-
ket a company could arrange for multiple shareholders to sell to one buyer, thereby reducing the 
total number of shareholders of record.  
200 Companies may view the secondary markets as having “created a legal quagmire that 
must be navigated.” Stone, supra note 83. Companies may be concerned about employee effort and 
retention. Cf. supra note 32. In addition, companies may be concerned about losing control over 
the shareholder base, inadvertently exceeding the record-holder threshold for going public, and 
valuation concerns regarding incentive compensation and an IPO. Today’s Marketplace for Securities 
of Pre-Public Companies and How We Got Here, CORP. COUNS., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 1, 3-4,  
available at https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Corporate-Counsel-
Todays-Marketplace-for-Securities-of-Pre-Public-Companies.pdf. And, although not a party to the 
secondary transaction, a company might be concerned about liability related to information it 
provides in connection with that process. Compliance with a registration exemption does not 
preclude liability under anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, such as Rule 10b-5 governing 
omissions or misstatements. See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 26 (noting that the “law is 
ambiguous as to whether the provision of information creates what is called a Rule 10b-5 liability 
obligation from the company to the purchaser” and discussing best practices for a company to 
avoid liability); J.J. Colao, ‘An Abomination That Should Stop’: What’s the Problem with Secondary 
Markets?, FORBES (June 29, 2012, 8:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/06/29/ 
an-abomination-that-should-stop-whats-the-problem-with-secondary-markets (noting the concern 
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Given that SecondMarket makes money by charging fees for the trans-
actions it facilitates, one might expect that its interests would sometimes 
diverge from requiring what would otherwise be optimal levels of infor-
mation to those contemplating a trade. Reports suggested that SecondMar-
ket did not require information disclosures from Facebook for secondary 
trading of its private shares.201 Facebook was the most actively traded stock 
on SecondMarket before Facebook went public, and the source of a 
significant portion of SecondMarket’s revenue.202 Hence, SecondMarket’s 
move to a model of working with companies to develop liquidity programs 
that include some information disclosure suggests that the market is 
responding to the problem—but the response may be insufficient. It is 
unclear whether all companies “listed” on SecondMarket have disclosed 
information and whether disclosures are of the type and amount that suffice 
to address the information concerns. Furthermore, it seems the information 
released to potential buyers is not standardized and so the company’s 
disclosures may be limited and selective.  
As we have seen, SharesPost does not require company involvement at all, 
apart from clearing any contractual restrictions on the stock. Its adaptations 
have been to provide historical trading data and third-party research 
reports. Consequently, while the private secondary markets have made 
some effort to promote information disclosure, they still raise concerns 
about the adequacy of the information available.  
Among participants, the markets have started to get the reputation of facil-
itating transactions “executed more on public perception rather than investing 
fundamentals.”203 Thus, despite the potential for private ordering to address 
the information issues in these markets, such an approach may be failing.204  
 
that companies whose stock is traded in secondary markets may face lawsuits); Memorandum 
from Goodwin Procter LLP to Annemarie Tierney, Gen. Counsel, SecondMarket Holdings, Inc. 3 
(Mar. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Goodwin Procter Memo], available at https://www.secondmarket. 
com/discover/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Memo-on-Secondary-Sale-Disclosure-Requirements-
Goodwin-Proctor.pdf (discussing Rule 10b-5 and noting there is no anti-fraud safe harbor).  
201 See Davidoff, supra note 93; supra text accompanying note 103. 
202 See Spears, supra note 89 (reporting on the fees that Facebook trading brought to Second-
Market before going public). 
203 SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 10-11. 
204 While it is difficult, if not dangerous, to draw conclusions from a single case, the Face-
book IPO may suggest flawed price discovery in the secondary markets. In the weeks after its May 
2012 IPO, Facebook stock fell to a price which had not been seen on private secondary markets 
since 2010. Compare Facebook on SecondMarket, SECONDMARKET, https://www.secondmarket. 
com/facebook-on-secondmarket (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (providing a history of Facebook share 
prices on SecondMarket), with Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Shares Dive as Deadline for Insider Sales 
Nears, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/us-facebook-
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B. Insider Trading 
In addition to the broader issue of information asymmetry between 
buyers and sellers, a more specific concern exists about insider trading in 
these new markets.205 Before the rise of these marketplaces, privately 
negotiated secondary transactions were possible but more difficult and 
costly to arrange.206 Buyers and sellers had to find each other without a 
central marketplace. Parties shared their identities, and the transactions 
were often heavily negotiated after extensive due diligence by the buyer for 
the purposes of valuing the stock and reducing information asymmetry and 
the opportunity for insider trading. Now, the online marketplaces provide 
the possibility of anonymity between the buyer and seller before the 
agreement is signed and a process which does less to reduce information 
asymmetry. This Section explores the concerns about insider trading in the 
private secondary markets. 
As a starting point, insider trading prohibitions are phrased broadly, 
applying to both public and private securities. Specifically, Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, provides that its 
fraud prohibitions apply “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”207  
Rule 10b-5 has developed into the SEC’s principal legal source for insider 
trading liability.208 Congress has not clearly defined insider trading, but the 
core notion developed through case law is that insider trading occurs when 
someone buys or sells securities on the basis of material nonpublic infor-
mation in breach of a fiduciary duty or a relationship of trust or confi-
dence.209 Such trading constitutes a “deceptive device” under section 10(b) 
 
shares-idUSBRE8711AS20120802 (reporting that the Facebook public share price dropped  
below $20).  
It would be imprudent to draw conclusions from this one example, however, because many 
factors contributed to the Facebook IPO and its subsequent pricing. With time, there will be more 
data to study the relationship between trading on private secondary markets and IPO pricing or 
pricing on a public market.  
205 For a discussion of the rationale for distinguishing insider trading from unobjectionable 
trading on informational advantages, see generally Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and 
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 329-33 (1979). 
206 See Stone, supra note 83, and accompanying text. 
207 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (emphasis added). 
208 See RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL 
§ 3.01 (2011). 
209 See generally Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 36 J. CORP. 
L. 343, 345-53 (2011) (noting that Congress and the SEC have not promulgated a definition of 
insider trading and discussing the history of insider trading law). Materiality is a fact-specific 
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and Rule 10b-5. Under current insider trading law, liability can arise in a 
few distinct ways.210 Under the “classical theory,” an insider is required to 
disclose her material nonpublic information before trading, or abstain from 
trading, if she owes a fiduciary duty to her trading partner.211 A “tippee” can 
be held liable in the same way if her “tipper” has such a duty.212 Under 
the “misappropriation theory,” a trader is subject to Rule 10b-5 liability 
when she misappropriates material nonpublic information in breach of a 
fiduciary duty to the source of the information.213 
Notably, the key insider trading cases have developed in the context of 
trading public company stock.214 Although the language of Rule 10b-5 
includes private company stock, insider trading actions against private 
securities traders have been nearly nonexistent to date.215 That may be 
because historically there has not been an active market for trading private 
company securities. And while liability is theoretically possible, given the 
broad phrasing of Rule 10b-5, the concept of insider trading is a somewhat 
problematic fit in the context of secondary transactions in private company 
shares. 
 
inquiry which looks at whether there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total 
mix’ of information made available.” Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 
(2011) (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)). For a discussion of how courts 
and the SEC have often ignored or disregarded fiduciary principles in insider trading cases despite 
the Supreme Court’s dictates, see generally Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual 
Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1336-64 (2009). 
210 In addition to the bases for liability discussed here, Rule 14e-3 prohibits traders from 
buying or selling securities using inside information related to a tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 
(2012). 
211 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
212 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (“[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty . . . not 
to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty 
to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should 
know that there has been a breach.”). 
213 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997); see also id. at 658 (“The mis-
appropriation theory comports with § 10(b)’s language, which requires deception ‘in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not deception of an identifiable purchaser or 
seller.”). 
214 See supra notes 211-13. 
215 One rare example includes a recent SEC enforcement proceeding involving a private 
company’s repurchasing of shares from employees at prices that did not reflect undisclosed higher 
third-party valuations and acquisition offers. See WINSTON & STRAWN, SEC RENEWS FOCUS 
ON INSIDER TRADING IN PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK (2011), available at http://www.winston. 
com/sitefiles/publications/SEC_Briefing_12_20_11%20(2).pdf (discussing SEC v. Stiefel Labs. 
Inc., No. 11-24438 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 12, 2011)). 
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For example, at the first level, there is a question of what information is 
actually public about a private company. As noted in Section III.A, private 
companies are not subject to mandatory disclosure rules like public compa-
nies. There is therefore not a base level of publicly available information 
about private companies, and they do not file periodic reports to update 
information. Indeed, there may be very little publicly available information 
about a private company, and much of the company’s finances and other 
material information may be nonpublic. 
Another challenge is that the proportion of shareholders with access to 
material nonpublic information is likely significantly greater in the private 
company context than the public one. Existing shareholders in venture-
backed private companies have typically become shareholders by being 
founders who helped establish the business, investors who acquired shares 
in a round of venture financing involving due diligence, or employees, 
former employees, or consultants awarded stock options as incentive 
compensation for their work for the company.216 All of these categories of 
shareholders might have inside knowledge about the company that may be 
material with regard to stock valuation. Furthermore, existing shareholders 
may be subject to company confidentiality agreements that reflect the 
private company’s desire to keep information private.  
Together, these differences suggest that a significant number of partici-
pants in the secondary markets may have material nonpublic information 
along with a corresponding duty to the company not to disclose that 
information. As a result, insider trading may be prevalent or difficult to 
avoid in secondary markets. The lack of public information about these 
companies and the proportion of people with access to material nonpublic 
information also raise the question of whether such holders can still buy or 
sell in a secondary transaction without violating insider trading laws. And 
without the participation of these shareholders, the secondary markets may 
be significantly constrained and fail to fully realize the benefits discussed in 
Part II.  
There are limited ways that insider participants might avoid or mini-
mize insider trading, apart from simply abstaining from trading. One 
possibility would be for a company to agree to disclose all material infor-
mation to the potential buyer—or at least all the material information that 
the existing shareholder has, on an ad hoc basis. For instance, SecondMar-
ket itself has recently arranged a share tender for its own stock, which it 
 
216 See Russolillo, supra note 91 (noting that, on SecondMarket, nearly eighty percent of 
sellers in the past year were ex-employees and eleven percent of sellers were current employees). 
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stated is the first of many liquidity events the company plans to arrange for 
its shareholders.217 In arranging such a liquidity event, the company can 
eliminate information disparities between buyers and sellers by allowing the 
sellers to share any material nonpublic information in their possession, and 
the company can require buyers to sign confidentiality agreements.  
Another possibility would be for a company to move to a more formal 
public company–style compliance program. While for many years a myth 
existed in Silicon Valley that insider trading rules did not apply to private 
company stocks,218 that understanding has been changing with the rise of 
secondary marketplaces and some private companies have started adopting 
insider trading policies.219 An insider trading policy could provide for 
trading windows with disclosures, as well as black-out periods, such as when 
the company is fundraising, executing or discussing material transactions, or 
around the end of the fiscal quarter or year.220 The company might also 
refrain from granting “observation rights,” which give an investor the 
ability to sit in on board meetings.221  
 
217 See Lizette Chapman, SecondMarket Shareholders Cash Out at $160M Valuation in Secondary 
Deal, DOW JONES PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL (Sept. 28, 2011), http://pevc.dowjones. 
com/Article?an=DJFPEA0020110928e79s0002t (reporting that SecondMarket allowed its 
shareholders to sell $13 million worth of shares based on a company valuation of $160 million). 
218 See, e.g., John Carney, Does Silicon Valley Have an Insider Trading Problem?, CNBC (Apr. 
1, 2011, 1:10 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/42377452/Does_Silicon_Valley_Have_an_Insider_ 
Trading_Problem (“Many in Silicon Valley apparently believe that insider trading rules don’t 
apply to buying or selling stakes in non-public companies like Twitter and Facebook.”); John 
Carney, Insider Trading in Silicon Valley, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2011, 10:39 AM ET), http://www.cnbc. 
com/id/42413987/Insider_Trading_in_Silicon_Valley (quoting a venture capitalist as asking the 
author, “How can there be an insider trading issue in the Valley if everyone buying is basically 
an insider?”). 
219 See, e.g., Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook Implements Insider-Trading Policy, WALL ST.  
J. DIGITS BLOG (Apr. 5, 2010, 7:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/04/05/facebook-
implements-insider-trading-policy (discussing how Facebook instituted an insider trading policy 
in 2010, while still a private company, “to better comply with insider trading laws and to protect 
the interests of the company and its employees and shareholders” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Stone, supra note 83 (discussing how Facebook, while still a private company, 
fired an employee for violating the company’s policy against trading in company stock). Legal 
implications aside, a company might seek to reduce the likelihood of insider trading in order to 
protect against the reputational injury that might result if insider trading by corporate managers 
or employees were to come to light. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of 
Insider Trading: A Comprehensive Primer 78 (2001) (unnumbered working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/ abstract_id=261277 (discussing possible reputational injury to corporations from 
insider trading by corporate managers). 
220 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 28-29. 
221 See supra note 191. 
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Alternatively, if the company is not willing to make disclosures and the 
shareholder is not selling pursuant to an established trading window, the 
party possessing the material nonpublic information might try to obtain a 
“big boy letter” in connection with the sale.222 A big boy letter is an 
“agreement . . . between parties to a securities transaction where one party, 
typically the seller, has material nonpublic information that it does not want 
to disclose, but both parties want to complete the transaction and preclude 
any claims based on the nondisclosure.”223 The letter typically includes a list 
of representations and a waiver of claims, essentially stating that the party is 
a “big boy” who elects to proceed with a transaction, even knowing the risks 
of doing so.  
But while a big boy letter might discourage or provide defenses in pri-
vate actions, it is not clear that such a letter would protect against govern-
ment enforcement of insider trading laws. After all, the SEC is not a party 
to big boy letters. Moreover, the government could potentially show that a 
defendant deceived the source of the material nonpublic information by not 
disclosing his trading activities to the source, or that he deceived the 
counterparty by not disclosing the specific nature and scope of the  
information.224 Indeed, SEC officials have suggested unofficially that big boy 
letters would not provide a defense to insider trading charges.225 In addition, 
the SEC has recently shown particular concern about insider trading by 
hedge funds, firms that frequently transact using big boy letters.226  
 
222 See SAWYER ET AL., supra note 30, at 31 (recommending, with reservations, the use of big 
boy letters to “provide disclosure to the [outside party] and [acknowledge] the dynamics that exist 
between the sophisticated buyer and seller transacting on an arm’s length basis”). 
223 Edwin D. Eshmoili, Note, Big Boy Letters: Trading on Inside Information, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 133, 135 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 18 INSIDER 
TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 3:19 (2012) (explaining that big boy 
letters “state that the buyer of securities is not relying on any information provided or not 
provided by the seller”). 
224 See Goodwin Procter Memo, supra note 200, at 6-7 (discussing how big boy letters “do 
not eliminate the risk of insider trading liability” and noting that “SEC officials have said that big 
boy letters will not affect SEC enforcement proceedings”).  
225 Eshmoili, supra note 223, at 156; see also, e.g., Complaint at 4-5, SEC v. Barclays Bank 
PLC, No. 07-04427 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (describing insider trading charges against the bank 
and a proprietary trader despite the use of big boy letters to advise counterparties about possession 
of material nonpublic information); Rachel McTague, ‘Big Boy’ Letter Not a Defense to SEC Insider 
Trading Charge, Official Says, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Dec. 3, 2007).  
226 See Jenny Anderson, Side Deals in a Gray Area, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at C1 (discuss-
ing an SEC case involving big boy letters and a hedge fund); SEC Staff Considers Use of ‘Big 
Boy’ Letters, Bingham McCutchen ( Jan. 15, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing the SEC’s 
“renewed interest” in insider trading cases involving big boy letters). 
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In sum, Rule 10b-5 is phrased broadly; its language covers private com-
pany stock and there are limited ways for participants in secondary markets 
to try to avoid or minimize insider trading. SecondMarket and SharesPost 
may require the parties to represent that they are not trading on the basis of 
material nonpublic information, but such representations may in actuality 
do little to prevent insider trading. Accordingly, the question arises as to 
how the government might or should respond—a question the next Part 
endeavors to answer.  
IV. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO INFORMATION ISSUES IN THE  
SECONDARY MARKETS FOR PRIVATE COMPANY STOCK 
The previous Parts have built on existing literature recognizing the po-
tentially beneficial role of the secondary markets for private stock, while 
drawing new attention to significant information issues in these markets. 
The secondary markets are still relatively new, and their future is unclear. 
Thus, the practical challenge going forward is determining whether these 
markets should be embraced, whether adequate responses to the infor-
mation issues can be devised, and, more broadly, whether the markets can 
be regulated in a way consistent with the SEC’s mandate to promote 
investor protection, capital formation, and market integrity. This Part 
explores potential responses to the information issues. 
A. Lack of Information, Asymmetric Information, and Conflicts of Interest 
Virtually no legal scholarship has offered a response to the information 
issues that threaten the legitimacy and efficiency of these markets. Popular 
media commentary addressing the issue has varied primarily between two 
polar viewpoints. Some observers have argued that the markets should be 
allowed to flourish unfettered since accredited investors are either sophisti-
cated or wealthy enough to withstand a loss.227 Conversely, others have 
expressed strong reservations about the surging, perhaps bubble-like, and 
potentially inaccurate valuations of some companies on these markets, 
suggesting that these markets should be subject to more regulatory oversight.228  
 
227 See, e.g., Sarah Lacy, Back Off SEC: Let’s Put the “Risk” of Secondary Markets in Perspective, 
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 29, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/12/29/back-off-sec-lets-put-the-risk-
of-secondary-markets-in-perspective (arguing that, since trading is restricted to accredited investors, 
the SEC should “stay out of the system until companies start crossing clear lines”).  
228 See, e.g., Liz Gannes, Does the LinkedIn IPO Validate Secondary Market Trading?, ALL-
THINGSD (May 19, 2011, 1:00 AM PST), http://allthingsd.com/20110519/does-the-linkedin-ipo-
validate-secondary-market-trading (lamenting that secondary market investors “must make stock 
buys based on hype and expectations”); Jeff Macke, Avoid Social Media Frenzy on Secondary 
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This Article argues for a middle path. The Supreme Court established 
more than a half-century ago that sophisticated investors do not need the 
same protections as the unsophisticated.229 With access to information, 
sophisticated investors are presumably able to “fend for themselves.”230 
That is, they are assumed to be in a position to get the information they 
need before investing or, alternatively, to take any lack of information into 
consideration in pricing stock.231 As only accredited investors and QIBs can 
buy private company stock on the secondary markets, there is arguably no 
need to expand regulation of secondary trading of private company stock. 
Yet, as Section III.A explained, investors on these private secondary 
markets may not have the appropriate type and amount of information, and 
access to this information may be difficult to obtain, particularly as investors 
are not in privity with the company in a secondary transaction. Given that 
the relevant regulatory structure was devised years before the rise of these 
new private secondary markets, some regulatory tweaking may be necessary 
to strengthen the markets and promote investor protection.  
This Article proposes two reforms to this end: a specified minimum 
level of disclosure for private secondary trading to fit within a registration 
exemption and a reevaluation of the accredited investor standard. 
One way to address the lack of information and the asymmetric infor-
mation in the secondary markets would be for the SEC to require a certain 
minimum level of disclosure in order for private company stock to be traded 
in secondary transactions. The SEC could issue new rules or interpretive 
guidance that specified certain disclosures required for secondary transac-
tions to fit within the established securities exemptions. For instance, the 
SEC could amend Rule 144 such that both affiliates and nonaffiliates would 
be subject to information requirements.  
The information required could include basic information critical to 
evaluating a company’s financial fundamentals and stock value. The 
disclosure required under Rule 701 of the Securities Act could serve as a 
 
Markets, YAHOO FIN. ( June 7, 2011, 11:58 AM EDT), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/ 
avoid-social-media-frenzy-secondary-markets-macke-155809254.html (arguing that the SEC should 
regulate secondary markets because outsiders will “lose big” due to the limited information about 
private companies and the likelihood of insider trading in these markets).  
229 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (declaring that transactions should 
be exempt from the Securities Act if “there is no practical need for [the Act’s] application” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
230 Id. 
231 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 17.3 (1986) (“Institutional investors are 
usually sophisticated and powerful enough to demand and get the information they need . . . .”). 
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useful reference point.232 Rule 701 provides a registration exemption for 
compensatory stock options, and requires private companies issuing over $5 
million in stock options within a twelve-month period to provide option-
holders with risk information and financial statements no more than 180 
days old.233 The SEC could also consider, by contrast, less and more 
stringent reference points—such as the Rule 144 exemption for affiliates 
selling restricted stock, and the full registration requirements or the JOBS 
Act on-ramp for newly public companies.234 In addition to considering 
these reference points, the SEC should seek public comment and engage in 
cost-benefit analysis to require disclosures properly tailored to the private 
secondary market context.235 
The goal would not be to replicate the extensive governance and report-
ing requirements of public companies, but rather to standardize a modest 
level of required information that would not overly burden the private 
companies and that sophisticated investors would find critical for basic 
valuation.236 In other words, the disclosure requirement is meant to address 
the concern that there is not enough information available to make prudent 
 
232 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e) (2012) (listing required disclosures). Exchange Act Rule 12h-1 
provided a similar registration exemption under the Exchange Act; the JOBS Act extended this 
relief by excluding from the Section 12(g) definition of record holders any persons who received 
securities pursuant to an employee compensation plan exempt from the Securities Act registration 
requirements. See supra note 73. 
233 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e); see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3 
SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 3:38 n.19 (2005) (further specifying the financial 
statements required to be disclosed). Companies may make the disclosures on a password-
protected Internet site and are permitted to condition disclosure on the optionholder’s agreement to 
maintain the confidentiality of the agreement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1 (f)(1)(vi) & (note); Exemption 
of Compensatory Employee Stock Options from Registration Under Section 12(g) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56887, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,554 (Dec. 7, 2007). 
234 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; supra note 41; supra note 57 and accompanying 
text. Rule 144 requires disclosure of current information about the issuer, principally the 
company’s most recent balance sheet, profit and loss statement, and retained earnings statement 
for the last and preceding fiscal years. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144(c)(2) & 240.15c2-11(a)(5). There is no 
requirement that the information be audited, and the standard for “reasonably current” infor-
mation under Rule 144(c)(2) is relatively lax. See Michael K. Molitor, Will More Sunlight Fade the 
Pink Sheets? Increasing Public Information About Non-Reporting Issuers with Quoted Securities, 39 IND. 
L. REV. 309, 335-38 (2006) (discussing the low information and timeliness standards under Rule 
15c2-11, incorporated by Rule 144(c)). 
235 For a discussion of the difficulties of doing cost-benefit analysis, and its role in SEC 
policymaking, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/ abstract_id=1984686. 
236 See id. (manuscript at 31) (“[A] disclosure regime makes sense, though we have to balance 
this benefit against the risk that government-mandated disclosure will turn out not to be cost-
efficient.”). 
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decisions, regardless of an investor’s accredited status.237 As one managing 
director of an investment firm said, “It’s hard enough to get information on 
Facebook. I’m an accredited [investor], I have an M.B.A. in finance, how do 
I know what these things should be valued at?”238 A moderate mandatory 
disclosure rule could correct for a market failure in information production 
and thereby strengthen these markets.239 
As this requirement could be structured as specific guidance for fitting 
any given transaction within an exemption, the information would not have 
to be disclosed to the public at large, but rather only to the secondary 
transaction participants. Such a requirement would allow companies to 
continue to use secure electronic data rooms and confidentiality agreements 
to maintain some level of control and confidentiality. Mature private 
companies whose stock is likely to be traded on secondary markets may 
have already prepared the same type of information for compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of Rule 701, and possibly for affiliate sellers who 
have sold stock pursuant to Rule 144. 
This idea reflects changes in the venture capital cycle—that the length-
ening period of time from a company’s formation to a major liquidity event 
has created mature private companies that straddle or blur the lines between 
previously held notions of public and private.240 SharesPost has said that it 
is “trying to create an interim market between the VC investing world and 
 
237 See id. (manuscript at 32) (“An active trading market disconnected from [private bargain-
ing over allocation of capital to the issuer], even among the sophisticated or wealthy, will not by 
itself generate a socially optimal amount or type of information.”). 
238 Rusli, supra note 95. 
239 Mandatory disclosure in the public markets is premised on the idea that the optimal 
amount of information will not be produced if left to normal market forces and that information is 
a public good. Explanations have been framed in terms of investor protection and efficiency, and 
grounded on benefits to investors and society more broadly. For an overview of mandatory 
disclosure literature, see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 286-314 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market 
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734-37 (1984); 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 
VA. L. REV. 669, 680-96 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why 
Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369-95 (1999); Michael D. 
Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 123, 186-88 (2004); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and 
Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 478-85 (2007); and Joel Seligman, The Historical Need 
for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 10-45 (1983). For a recent survey of 
literature on financial reporting, see generally Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environ-
ment: Review of the Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296 (2010). 
240 See generally Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 235 (discussing the “public-private 
divide” in securities regulation). 
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the public markets;”241 this proposal would establish a corresponding 
interim level of disclosure. This idea might become increasingly important 
as the secondary markets continue to develop and change, particularly in 
times of bubble-like exuberance.242  
The idea has limitations, however, and some of the concerns about in-
formation issues in these markets would likely remain. One can imagine 
scenarios where, despite the availability of certain basic information, private 
companies would not disclose other important information for valuing their 
stock. Participants in these markets would still have to make their own 
determinations of whether they had sufficient information to make invest-
ment decisions. This proposal would only set a standard minimum level of 
disclosure to address a fundamental information failure.  
Furthermore, while an interim level of disclosure responds to the lack of 
information and asymmetric information, it does not directly address 
conflicts of interest. While a certain base level of information might help 
counteract biased research reports, a separate response to the conflict of 
interest issue may be necessary. 
In addition, there is, of course, a cost associated with requiring disclo-
sure, however modest. Companies could be concerned that the information 
disclosed would not remain confidential and might refuse to make the 
required disclosures, effectively preventing shareholders from selling their 
stock on the secondary markets. Such a move could decrease the liquidity of 
some private company stock relative to the current situation, and constrain 
the growth of these markets. Furthermore, a minimum information 
mandate might require more company involvement than SharesPost 
currently includes in its model. Requiring information disclosures might 
necessitate moving to a model that creates controlled liquidity events rather 
than one that aims for an active marketplace. 
The cost could, however, be kept moderate, similar to Rule 701’s infor-
mation requirements, which apply to companies issuing significant stock 
 
241 Yarow, supra note 10. 
242 For example, if the markets were to develop in such a way that higher value or more 
mature firms constrained trading in their stock, but riskier, lower value firms did not, information 
standards might become even more important. See Guttentag, supra note 70, (manuscript at 35) 
(discussing the “lemons” problem, witnessed in European markets, which predicts negative 
spillover effects in markets where firms provide only limited amounts of information); see also 
Gannes, supra note 41 (noting that one well-regarded VC firm has started instructing its portfolio 
companies to include a right of first refusal on all stock options so that they can buy stock back 
instead of allowing outside transactions).  
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options or compensatory equity awards.243 If so, many companies might 
voluntarily cooperate, as evidenced by SecondMarket’s newer business 
model, which is based on significant issuer involvement. While companies 
may be sensitive to the number of shareholders and other concerns related 
to secondary trading,244 they may also find they benefit in the long run from 
the presence of vibrant secondary markets.245 Further, over time, investors 
may be able to exert leverage over companies for minimal disclosures, either 
because of their size or number.  
A second way to address concerns about information issues is to re-
examine the definition of “accredited investor,” established in Rule 501 of 
Regulation D.246 This proposal does not directly deal with the amount or 
quality of information available, but rather addresses the concern that there 
are individuals participating in the secondary markets who cannot fend for 
themselves.  
The definition of “accredited investor” aims to capture investors who 
are sophisticated enough to make their own trades, or who can afford to 
hire advisors, and so do not need securities law protections.247 Net worth 
and income serve as objective proxies for this ability to fend for oneself.248 
As a result, the accredited investor definition is notoriously under- and 
over-inclusive.249 It is underinclusive because financially knowledgeable 
investors may not meet the minimum wealth requirements for accredited 
status, and overinclusive because wealthy individuals without financial 
sophistication may qualify as accredited.  
Moreover, despite various narrow SEC proposals and small modifica-
tions in the Dodd-Frank Act,250 the definition has not changed substantially 
 
243 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra notes 65-74, 200 and accompanying text. 
245 See supra Part II. 
246 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
247 See Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation By Exemption: The Changing Definition of an Accredited 
Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 683 (2008) (noting that such an investor “generally is defined in 
terms of wealth, on the theory that an accredited investor can hire knowledgeable and sophisticated 
advisors”); supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.  
248 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
249 See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 279, 310-11 (2000) (noting that the term “may treat otherwise financially sophisticated 
investors as nonaccredited, while treating financial neophytes as accredited”); Wallis K. Finger, 
Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 
Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 748 (2009) (observing that “a financial novice” can be accredited 
“based upon the accident of being rich”).  
250 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010) (adjusting the accredited investor standard for natural persons 
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since it was promulgated in 1982,251 and the minimum net worth and income 
requirements are arguably outdated.252 With inflation and growth in wealth, 
many more individuals today meet the requirements than when the 
guidelines were set.253  
A reexamination of the definition could look at whether the objective 
threshold should be raised as well as whether another component should be 
added or substituted to minimize the under- and over-inclusiveness.254 The 
net worth or income test may be a better proxy for sophistication and access 
to information in the context of primary issuances, where the investor is in 
privity with the issuer, than in secondary trading, where the investor is not 
and may have more difficulty gaining access to information.255 It would thus 
be worthwhile to study whether proposals for other components such as a 
licensing scheme, strengthened suitability requirements on broker-dealers, 
or a move to a multi-factored approach would better serve stated goals in 
this secondary context.256 In short, the thresholds may be too low and too 
 
so that the net worth requirement is $1 million, excluding the value of the investor’s primary 
residence); Finger, supra note 249, at 734-36 (noting that in 2006 and 2007 the SEC proposed 
alternative definitions of accredited investor). The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to 
periodically review the accredited investor standard and adjust it “as the Commission may deem 
appropriate for the protection of investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.” 
Dodd-Frank Act § 413(b)(1)(B). 
251 Finger, supra note 249, at 743.  
252 Karmel, supra note 247, at 681. 
253 See SEC Proposes Liberalization of Private Placement Requirements, MORRISON FOERSTER 
(Aug. 9, 2007), http://www.mofo.com/pubs/xpqPublicationDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=7867 
(noting that, due to inflation, the percentage of American households qualifying as accredited 
investors has increased from approximately 1.64% of households in 1982 to approximately 8.47% of 
households). 
254 See Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological 
Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 22 
(1998) (expressing “skepticism about the self-protective abilities of seemingly sophisticated 
investors” and suggesting a careful empirical study of investment decisionmaking of investors in 
private securities offerings, including “solid demographic work, as well as inquiry into the process 
and influences on purchase decisions”). 
255 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 235, at 30-31 (“‘Fending for oneself’ is easier 
when the investor is in privity or near-privity with the issuer, because representations and 
warranties can be extracted fairly directly; in aftermarket trading, by contrast, the link between 
issuer and investor is broken.”). 
256 See Choi, supra note 249, at 284 (re-imagining the federal securities law regime to classify 
investors into four groups based on their knowledge and resources, using a licensing system); 
Fletcher, supra note 42, at 1149-54 (suggesting a multi-factored approach to decide whether an 
investor is sophisticated, using investor-specific information); Finger, supra note 249, at 759-62 
(criticizing the accredited investor definition and proposing a licensing scheme to supplement the 
current definition); Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The 
Lacunae in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 313-14 (1994) (expressing 
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imprecise to ensure that investors can fend for themselves in secondary 
markets for private company stock, where the protections of the public 
markets are not present.  
Providing guidance or modest regulatory reform on information disclo-
sure and the accredited investor thresholds will serve investor protection 
and market integrity goals, and in turn allow the secondary markets to grow 
and evolve. 
B. Insider Trading 
Increasing the minimum information disclosed, as suggested above, 
might help reduce information asymmetries in the secondary markets, and 
in turn might reduce insider trading. Yet, as the proposal does not recom-
mend the disclosure of all material information, there is no reason to believe 
that setting a minimum level of information disclosure would eliminate 
insider trading. Traders could still possess nonpublic, material information 
and be in a position to benefit by trading on that information, in breach of a 
fiduciary duty or relationship of trust or confidence. Thus, even with the 
proposed information requirement, concerns about insider trading in the 
private secondary markets would remain. 
A scholarly debate about whether insider trading should be regulated at 
all has raged for over half a century.257 Critics of insider trading regulation 
have argued that insider trading increases share price efficiency, causes no 
harm to other traders, is an efficient compensation scheme for managers, 
and mitigates agency costs.258 Supporters of insider trading regulation have 
argued that insider trading is unfair, does not contribute significantly to price 
efficiency, may reduce investor confidence in securities markets, increases 
transaction costs and decreases market liquidity by increasing bid-ask 
spreads, constitutes a misappropriation of information and wealth better 
assigned to the corporation, and creates perverse incentives for manage-
 
concerns about the treatment of wealthy, unsophisticated, accredited investors, and proposing “a 
more meaningful suitability requirement”).  
257 For the seminal work that sparked this debate, see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRAD-
ING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).  
258 For literature describing the various arguments for why insider trading should not be 
regulated, see MACEY, supra note 142, and MANNE, supra note 257. Cf. Dennis W. Carlton & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 868 (1983) 
(“[C]ommunicating information through insider trading may be of value to the firm.”); Michael 
P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1980) (noting that 
insider trading regulations, if they are to be justified, cannot be justified on the basis of protecting 
consumers since they typically do not).  
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ment.259 Policy prescriptions have run the gamut from proposals that 
insider trading be fully legalized260 or partially legalized261 to claims that it 
should be more aggressively tracked and punished.262 Despite extensive 
literature and a multitude of empirical studies, scholars have not reached a 
conclusive resolution in the debate.263 As a practical matter, however, the 
SEC and the courts have long enforced the insider trading prohibition, and 
so this Section starts from that premise. This Section does not seek to 
rehash the debate about insider trading generally, but rather focuses on 
potential responses in the specific context of the private secondary markets.  
The SEC is in the unfortunate position of choosing between imperfect 
paths of action regarding insider trading in private company stocks. Each of 
the three options outlined below comes with some drawbacks. The choice is 
particularly difficult as pertinent empirical questions, such as how much 
insider trading is actually taking place in the secondary markets and to what 
extent market participants are aware of the level of insider trading, remain 
unanswered. 
One option for the SEC is proactively to enforce existing insider trad-
ing laws in the secondary markets. The SEC could take a two-pronged 
approach by issuing guidance, similar to its approach on insider trading 
policies and big boy letters, as well as launching investigations into specific 
transactions. Doing so would draw attention to the applicability of insider 
trading laws to private company stock and put investors on notice. It would 
 
259 For literature describing the various arguments why insider trading should be regulated, 
see LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 762 (3d ed. 
1995); Brudney, supra note 205, at 327-28; Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 330-33; Nicholas L. 
Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and 
Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1, 17-46 (1993); Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 630-32 (1984); 
Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 
80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051-53 (1982); Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 119; Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 
VA. L. REV. 117, 122 (1982); and Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and 
Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 817-18 (1980). 
260 See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did 
Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167 (2005). 
261 See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, Overvalued Equity and the Case for an Asymmetric Insider 
Trading Regime, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1096-98 (2006) (suggesting that price-decreasing 
insider trading should be allowed but not price-enhancing insider trading). 
262 See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 209, at 379 (asserting that insider trading laws support ideals 
of fairness, protect corporations’ property, and aid economic efficiency). 
263 Stephen Clark, Insider Trading and Financial Economics: Where Do We Go From Here?, 16 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 43, 57 (2010). 
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also give the SEC the opportunity to provide helpful clarification as to 
proper practices for private companies opening trading windows, and would 
be in line with the SEC’s revived interest in insider trading generally.264 
Further, recent empirical work suggests that insider trading enforcement is 
associated with increased liquidity and lower cost of equity.265 
As a practical matter, though, it may be difficult to police insider trading 
in private company stock. Illegal insider trading is generally quite difficult to 
prove—traders can hide behind proxies, it can be hard to determine what the 
trader knew at the time of the trade, and direct evidence is rare.266 Indeed, 
the SEC itself has acknowledged this difficulty.267 And it may be even more 
challenging for the government to detect insider trading in the private 
company stock context because stock prices and trading information are not 
publicly available and no baseline of publicly reported information exists.  
Moreover, an aggressive approach has the potential to squash the online 
secondary markets while they are still in a delicate initial stage. Many 
shareholders might have access to material nonpublic information, or seem 
as though they might,268 and, after seeing an insider trading case in the 
headlines, might not be willing to sell due to fears of investigation or 
liability. With increased attention on insider trading in these markets, 
outsiders may fixate on—or overestimate—the risk of buying from insiders269 
 
264 The government has recently brought novel insider trading charges in a variety of cases, 
including its prosecution of one of the biggest insider trading cases in history. See Prentice, supra 
note 209, at 344 & n.1 (describing recent insider trading cases involving instruments such as credit 
default swaps, new theories such as under 18 U.S.C § 1348, and defendants such as employers, 
famous billionaires, and administrative assistants). 
265 See Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An 
Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 240, 273-80 
(2007) (finding that “countries with more stringent insider trading laws have more dispersed 
equity ownership; more liquid stock markets; and more informative stock prices”); Utpal 
Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 104 (2002) 
(“[E]nforcement of insider trading laws . . . is associated with a reduction in the cost of equity in a 
country.”). But see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical 
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 144-49 (2004) (question-
ing the causal link between regulation and market liquidity). 
266 Clark, supra note 263, at 47-48. 
267 See id. at 64 n.130 (quoting testimony of an SEC director that insider trading cases “are 
unquestionably among the most difficult cases we are called upon to prove, and despite careful and 
time-consuming investigations, we may not be able to establish all of the facts necessary to 
support an insider trading charge”). 
268 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
269 Cf. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
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and subsequently lose confidence in the secondary markets. In turn, that 
lost confidence could decrease liquidity and increase the cost of capital.270 
Responses are difficult to predict, however, as arguably outsiders might have 
increased confidence in the markets upon seeing government oversight.271  
Another option is for the SEC to do nothing—to take a wait-and-see 
approach, without taking significant actions to investigate insider trading or 
issue guidance. This approach may be a sensible one for now, as the markets 
are still developing, and over time their role and size will become clearer. 
And in the meantime, to the extent that insider trading allows information 
to be impounded in the price of securities, insider trading in these markets 
might be increasing pricing efficiency.272 Corporate insiders tend to have 
the best information about the company’s financial health and prospects, 
and when they buy or sell their company’s stock “they convey valuable 
information to the marketplace.”273 Improved pricing efficiency may also 
lead to a more efficient allocation of resources.274 
But this do nothing or wait-and-see approach also has its drawbacks. 
Participants would continue to face uncertainty about SEC views if it did 
not act or issue guidance. In addition, the SEC could face mounting 
political pressure to regulate. It could face harsh criticism if egregious 
examples of insider trading were to come to light amid lax enforcement. 
Further, supporters of an insider trading prohibition might worry that the 
incidence of insider trading in private company stock would increase as 
insiders discovered they could get away with it. And if outsiders perceived 
an unchecked insider trading problem, they might refuse to participate or 
excessively discount prices.275 As previously noted, however, it is difficult to 
 
270 For a discussion of how liquidity may affect the cost of equity, see, for example, 
MAUREEN O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY (1995); Yakov Amihud & Haim 
Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 246 (1986); and Michael J. 
Brennan & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: On the Compensation 
for Illiquidity in Stock Returns, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 441, 459 (1996). 
271 See Clark, supra note 263, at 58 (considering the argument that outsiders would lose 
confidence in a market where insiders can use material nonpublic information to make abnormal 
profits in trades with outsiders).  
272 See Manne, supra note 260, at 169 (“[T]he argument for a strong positive relationship 
between market efficiency and insider trading has proved to be very robust.”). But see Gilson & 
Kraakman, supra note 259, at 632 (arguing that it would aid efficiency if insiders were required to 
disclose their identity and the size of their trade before trading).  
273 Lambert, supra note 261, at 1054. 
274 Id. 
275 See, e.g., Macke, supra note 228 (calling buyers of private company stock in secondary 
markets “the quintessential suckers at the poker table, regardless of whether they make the couple 
hundred thousand a year needed to qualify as accredited”). 
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predict whether government pursuit of insider trading cases in the second-
ary markets would encourage or discourage participation.276  
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, Congress or the SEC could 
affirmatively create a safe harbor from the insider trading prohibition for 
secondary trading of private company stocks. To the extent that insider 
trading is difficult to avoid in the context of private company stock, a safe 
harbor would provide valuable clarity and latitude. Such a move would 
make sense if the SEC were to determine that the benefits of the secondary 
private markets outweighed the value or importance of enforcing insider 
trading laws in this area. The safe harbor might also serve as a useful 
experiment for testing the frequently made argument in favor of deregula-
tion—essentially, that corporations should (and will) set their own insider 
trading policies by contract.277 Further, as buyers in the secondary markets 
must be either QIBs or accredited investors, one could argue in favor of 
treating insider trading differently in these markets than in public markets. 
In theory, participants in the private secondary markets should have the 
sophistication to understand the risks they face and to address them by 
inquiring into their counterparties’ information, requiring a representation 
that they are not trading on inside information, or adjusting the price at 
which they are willing to trade.278 Participants should also have the financial 
capability to withstand losing money on an investment. 
Like the other options, this safe harbor approach also has its downsides. 
As with the do nothing or wait-and-see approach, it is possible that a safe 
harbor for insider trading in the private secondary markets may lead 
outsiders to refuse to participate or to discount prices excessively, which 
could have deleterious effects on the private secondary markets. Further, if 
one believes that insider trading should be prohibited in general, the 
reasoning applies with equal force in the private context. Finally, despite 
arguments about the sophistication of investors in the private secondary 
markets, the SEC may have concerns about adopting an inconsistent policy 
across markets. 
While there is a relatively clean slate in choosing between these options, 
one might make the uneasy case for the first approach of enforcement and 
 
276 See supra text accompanying note 271. 
277 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 258, at 863 (applying the Coase theorem to insider 
trading and arguing that private ordering will result in optimal allocation of property rights in 
information); see also David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 
80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986) (expanding application of the Coase theorem to insider trading). 
278 See Scott, supra note 259, at 807-09 (noting that if insider trading is known, outsiders will 
not be disadvantaged because the price they pay will reflect the risk of insider trading). 
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guidance by observing that the arguments in favor of insider trading 
regulation in the public company context are at least as strong and perhaps 
stronger in the private marketplace. Since the SEC actively enforces insider 
trading in public markets, it seems to follow that it would do so in the 
private context. 
To start, while the argument that insider trading contributes to share 
price efficiency279 maintains its strength in the private company stock 
context, the other key anti-regulation argument—that insider trading causes 
no harm—arguably does not.280 The argument that insider trading causes no 
harm is premised on a liquid, impersonal market. It posits “that no real 
damage is caused to an investor who engages anonymously on an exchange 
in a trade with an insider on the other side of the transaction”281 because 
“the seller has made an independent decision to sell without knowing that 
the insider is buying; if the insider were not buying, the seller would still 
sell.”282 The new secondary markets for private company stock are not 
liquid and impersonal like public markets, however. These markets are 
thinly traded, and at times posted offers to buy or sell go unmatched.283 
Thus, in some instances, if the insider did not buy or sell, the transaction 
would not otherwise occur. Further, trades in the private market are 
customized transactions between two identifiable parties.284 Thus, insider 
trading may indeed harm individual investors in the private company stock 
context.  
 
279 For counterarguments that insider trading causes efficiency losses, see Lambert, supra 
note 261, at 1050-51. 
280 In his seminal work, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Henry Manne actually made 
three arguments against regulating insider trading, but he has since largely discounted one of 
them, and thus this Article does not address it. See Manne, supra note 260, at 170-71 (“My second 
‘positive’ argument for insider trading, that it could perform well as a part of an executive 
compensation package, has been the more forcefully attacked, and it is perhaps less robust than I 
and other proponents had originally assumed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
281 Manne, supra note 260, at 168. 
282 Bainbridge, supra note 219, at 72. 
283 See generally Yarow, supra note 10 (quoting the SharesPost CEO commenting on the 
varying levels of activity in the private marketplace). 
284 See supra Section I.B. Uninformed outsiders can be expected to systematically lose in 
trades with insiders. See Lee, supra note 259 at 160-61 (“Since insiders will only buy when stock is 
undervalued and sell when stock is overvalued, outside investors who trade simultaneously with 
and in the opposite direction from insiders will always be buying when the price is too high or selling 
when the price is too low.”); see also Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
Mar.–Apr. 1971, at 12, 13 (showing that market makers always lose to informed traders). 
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Furthermore, the arguments against insider trading maintain their 
weight in the private stock context. For example, despite scholarly criticism,285 
unfairness has been one of the primary rationales for prohibiting insider 
trading.286 There is no reason to believe concerns about fairness would be 
different in the private secondary market context. Observers have asserted 
that the unfairness in insider trading stems from insiders’ unequal access to 
information, their ability to act against their principals’ interests for their 
own personal profit, and their ability to profit in a way that is not correlated 
with any value created for their firms.287 These perceived sources of 
unfairness apply equally well to insiders trading in private company or 
public company stocks.  
Another argument for imposing insider trading liability which also 
maintains its strength in the private company context is that the prohibition 
protects corporations’ property interests in information. In brief, a rule 
allowing insider trading assigns a property interest in the nonpublic 
information to the insider, whereas a rule prohibiting insider trading assigns 
it to the corporation. The property-based approach maintains that assigning 
the right to the corporation is better because it “protect[s] the economic 
incentive to produce socially valuable information.”288 Notably, allowing 
insider trading in private company stock would still effectively assign a 
property right to corporate information to insiders—and there still would 
not be a good reason for doing so. 
In sum, the SEC has a difficult path to navigate in deciding how to han-
dle insider trading in private company stock. All of the SEC’s options—to 
 
285 See, e.g., Manne, supra note 260, at 182 n.60 (criticizing fairness arguments against insider 
trading as “puerile”); Bainbridge, supra note 219, at 71 (arguing that we cannot articulate a 
definition of fairness that sufficiently justifies the insider trading prohibition and that most 
definitions of fairness “collapse into . . . efficiency-based rationales”). 
286 E.g., Prentice, supra note 209, at 380-81; see also, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Essay, Insider Absten-
tion, 113 YALE L.J. 455, 456 (2003) (“Although academics still debate the economic desirability of 
insider trading, the consensus among the American public, Congress, and the SEC is that insider 
trading is ‘unfair’ and erodes investor confidence in the market.”); James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and 
the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 362 n.82 (2010) (noting that it may be 
unjust to allow insiders to take advantage of informational asymmetry because the insider has 
obtained information specifically by virtue of his position rather than by deliberately acquiring 
information (citing Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1978))).  
287 See Prentice, supra note 209, at 379-83 (summarizing fairness arguments). 
288 Bainbridge, supra note 219, at 78-79. In addition, the case for assigning the right to insid-
ers is arguably weak because insider trading is “an inefficient compensation scheme.” Id. at 80; see 
also Manne, supra note 260, at 170-71 n.14 (acknowledging weaknesses in the argument for viewing 
insider trading as executive compensation). 
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enforce insider trading laws proactively, to do nothing, or to create a safe 
harbor—come with pros and cons. This Section takes as a given the current 
regime and observes that the argument for enforcing insider trading liability 
remains at least as strong in the private market context as in the public, and 
is perhaps stronger because arguably insider trading causes harm on these 
less liquid, more personal markets. This observation is made with some 
caution, however, as enforcing insider trading laws in private company stock 
has to date been relatively rare. Likewise, empirical facts such as how often 
insider trading occurs in these markets and its effect on the markets are 
unknown.  
V. THE TENSION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC MARKETS 
The previous Parts have examined the secondary markets for private 
company stock, information issues in these markets, and potential responses 
to these concerns. This Part seeks to tie this examination to broader policy 
questions and provide some preliminary observations.  
In short, fostering the growth of private markets implicates an underly-
ing tension with public markets and the policy rationales that undergird the 
divide between public and private companies. The new secondary markets 
have the potential to play an important role in the private company 
ecosystem, but their growth might also pose a threat to public markets or to 
the values that we aim to further by maintaining and regulating them.289  
A robust secondary market can play the beneficial role, discussed in Part 
II, of increasing liquidity in private company stock. This liquidity may be 
useful to the venture capital industry, which supports innovation and 
growth companies that provide a host of economic and technological 
benefits to society. The potential for liquidity may also help start-up 
companies with their fundraising, and it may bolster their ability to use 
stock options to recruit and retain employees. 
The flip side, however, is that a robust secondary market might lead 
companies to choose to stay private longer or to avoid the public realm 
altogether.290 The need for liquidity has been a key reason for companies to 
 
289 See Langevoort, supra note 254, at 11 (identifying as an issue “whether the [SEC] is will-
ing to permit the kind of threat to the role of the organized exchanges that a deep and liquid 
market for private securities would pose”). 
290 See Ronald D. Orol, SEC Hints at Easing of Rules for Non-Public Trades, WALL ST. J. 
MARKETWATCH (May 10, 2011), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-05-10/economy/30731548_ 
1_secondmarket-private-shares-offering-rules (citing Professor John Coffee as arguing that private 
companies would continue to avoid going public if possible and that relaxing the rules for trading 
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go public; if secondary markets can increase the liquidity of private company 
stock, that incentive loses much of its force.291 
Indeed, the secondary markets explicitly aim to help companies stay 
private. The CEO of SharesPost explained:  
Two of the biggest reasons to go public are to get liquidity for your existing 
shareholders and to gain efficient access to growth capital. We’ve stepped 
back and said, “Can we provide those two solutions for these companies?” 
And if so, give the companies the opportunity to go public over their time 
frame as opposed to “I’ve got a gun to my head.” Now the companies have 
much more control over the process and timing of if and when they do a 
public listing.292  
Similarly, the CEO of SecondMarket commented:  
[T]he public markets [are] permanently broken. And I think there’s an 
opportunity here to create an entirely new exchange, an entirely new mar-
ketplace that’s good for companies . . . I think over time what you’re going 
to see is more and more companies choosing to stay private and choosing to 
be a part of the new market structure that we’ve created.293  
Further, SecondMarket was an “early and forceful advocate[]”294 for the 
JOBS Act reforms, which significantly raised the record-holder threshold 
for going public and eliminated the prohibition against “general solicita-
tion” in private offerings.295 These reforms could help companies stay 
 
private company stock “would hurt transparency, make the market less efficient and increase 
fraud”). 
291 Cf. Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEUR-
IAL BUS. L.J. 649, 661-63 (2008) (“[O]ne of the primary benefits of going public is that it permits 
insiders to cash out of the business . . . [and] permits a company to use equity as compensation.”); 
Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 641 (“Going public offers a company a number of advantages, including 
enhanced reputation, establishment of a market value for the company, and a broadened 
ownership base. For many companies, however, the primary advantages of going public are 
securing a large infusion of equity capital and attaining share liquidity.” (footnote omitted)). 
292 Yarow, supra note 10. 
293 Silbert, supra note 84, at 22:22–23:54; see also Ben Popper, Forget Facebook, the IPO Market 
Is Dying, Says SecondMarket CEO Barry Silbert, VENTUREBEAT ( Jan. 17, 2012, 8:40 AM), http:// 
venturebeat.com/2012/01/17/secondmarket-facebook-ipo-private-shares-barry-silbert (quoting Second-
Market CEO Barry Silbert as saying, “We want to create a market where anyone who is a 20 
percent holder of a company with a valuation of $150 million or more can get liquidity on their 
investment within two years”). 
294 Q1 2012 Business Update, SECONDMARKET (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.secondmarket. 
com/discover/reports/q1-2012-business-update. 
295 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 201 & 501, 126 Stat. 306, 313, 325 (2012).  
  
2012] Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0 237 
 
private longer, and, as SecondMarket and SharesPost branch out to 
facilitating private placements,296 could allow for more aggressive marketing 
in the private capital raising process.297 
It is no wonder that the secondary markets aim to help companies stay 
private, as the secondary markets may benefit when companies do so.298 The 
online markets are private companies themselves and receive fees for 
transactions.299 The greater the trading activity through their sites, the more 
money they make. Mature private company stock has been the most 
actively traded on the sites, and the sites suffer a blow when companies such 
as Facebook go public.300  
However, from a policy perspective, there may be considerable down-
sides to robust private secondary markets that parallel public markets. 
Federal securities laws mandate registration, designed to protect investors 
and ensure confidence in the integrity of our capital markets.301 Expanding 
exemptions and loosening strictures on sales of restricted stock increases the 
scope of securities issued and traded without the safeguard of registration.302 
The venture capital model uses a portfolio strategy that recognizes that 
many businesses will fail,303 but individual buyers might not sufficiently 
 
296 See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also Spears, supra note 89 (“SecondMarket . . . 
plans to raise money from its clients for at least eight different investment funds, run by outside 
managers . . . .”). The JOBS Act also raised the offering limits under Regulation A from $5 million 
to $50 million and created a new exemption under the Securities Act for a type of capital raising 
known as “crowdfunding,” which uses the Internet to pool small individual contributions. JOBS 
Act §§ 301–402. 
297 See, e.g., Spears, supra note 89 (noting that the elimination of the general solicitation ban 
“eas[es] the way for both SecondMarket and SharesPost to jump into that business”). Note that all 
actual purchasers of the securities must still be by accredited investors or QIBs. JOBS Act § 201. 
298 See, e.g., J.J. Colao, Breaking Down the JOBS Act: Inside the Bill That Would Transform 
American Business, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012, 11:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/ 
03/21/jobs-act (“Private secondary market companies like SecondMarket and SharesPost would 
benefit substantially from this reform [raising the shareholder cap to 2000], as it would likely lead 
to a larger, more robust market for the shares of private companies.”); Spears, supra note 89 (“The 
JOBS Act may also broaden the universe of stocks available for trading on these platforms. It 
allows companies to amass more shareholders while staying private.”). 
299 See supra Section I.B. 
300 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
301 See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Securities Act at its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a 
Robust Registration Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 757-59 (2009) (describing the SEC’s 
objectives in requiring securities registration). 
302 Id. at 753.  
303 See BURSTEIN & SCHWERIN, supra note 30, at 4, 8 (describing the typical venture invest-
ing strategy as “swinging for the fences,” with investments that are either “home runs or strike 
outs,” and noting that, in the last decade, venture capital dollars went into over 30,000 financing 
rounds for companies that never had a successful traditional exit). 
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diversify or understand the risks of investing in private companies.304 
Further, the information that is available may give investors a false sense of 
security about the risks of investing and the accuracy of pricing. 
And even if there is little concern for protecting accredited investors, 
there is reason to believe that private secondary market activity may affect 
retail investors. The Facebook IPO provides an example of how these two 
types of investors may be connected. According to its prospectus, Facebook 
relied on the market transaction method and “recent private stock sale 
transactions” as factors in determining its offering price valuation.305 In 
addition, its amended prospectus noted that a revision in its anticipated 
IPO price was influenced by “third-party private stock sale transactions in 
January 2012.”306 Thus the initial public offering price was set with refer-
ence to the share price on the secondary markets. Retail investors accounted 
for a significant amount of the stock bought in Facebook’s IPO.307  
Even apart from the investor protection aspect of registration, many 
securities laws that apply to public companies, such as Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank, are actually corporate governance laws as well. Companies 
that choose to stay private avoid not only registration, but also the reach of 
 
304 In addition, smaller companies present a disproportionate risk of failure and fraud. See 
Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 58 (1998) (“[R]egulators have identified small businesses as some of the 
riskiest investment opportunities.”).  But cf. supra note 204. 
305 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 63 (Feb. 1, 2012). The secondary 
markets may be encouraging reliance on their pricing data. SharesPost has made “real-time” 
pricing data for US-based private companies available on Bloomberg terminals. Press Release, 
Sharespost, SharesPost Data on Private Companies Now Included on Bloomberg Terminals (Nov. 
9, 2011), available at https://www.sharespost.com/bloomberg. 
306 Facebook, Inc., Amendment No. 8 to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 78 
(May 16, 2012); see also Shelly Palmer, Facebook’s IPO: A View From The West, SYS-CON MEDIA 
(May 23, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://www.sys-con.com/node/2282015/ (“[T]he private market already 
signaled pricing to the public markets well in advance of the IPO so the banks had very little 
flexibility with pricing without facing sharp questions from either the company or the investors.”); 
Felix Salmon, Facebook’s SecondMarket Muppets, REUTERS (May 30, 2012, 9:57 PM), http:// 
blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/05/30/facebooks-secondmarket-muppets (“[B]asic economic 
theory suggests that if a stock has buyers at $44 privately, then its public value will be higher than 
that, since the universe of potential buyers expands enormously. Given that theory, it would have 
been really hard, I think, for Morgan Stanley to price the IPO below the levels seen on Second-
Market for most of the previous year . . . .”). 
307 See Jean Eaglesham & Telis Demos, Lawmakers Push for Overhaul of IPO Process, WALL 
ST. J., June 21, 2012, at A1 (“Morgan Stanley [] allocated to retail investors 26% of shares, much 
higher than the 15% allocation in a typical IPO.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Facebook Gold Rush: 
Fanfare vs. Realities, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, at BU5 (“Indications are that Facebook was bought 
primarily by individual investors, not institutions. Indeed, institutions that had invested early 
were big sellers in the I.P.O.”). 
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many corporate governance provisions. Moreover, a host of other laws, such 
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),308 impose burdens on public 
companies not directly relating to disclosure or governance. Scholars have 
begun to explore ways of reconceiving the “publicness” of corporations that 
capture the dimensions beyond public reporting.309 The JOBS Act’s on-
ramp provisions have also recently provided a glimpse into how public 
reporting obligations might be unbundled from governance and other 
obligations.310 These developments demonstrate the need to grapple more 
fully and systematically with questions such as what additional burdens 
should be placed on different types of companies and whether line drawing 
should be done with reference to whether or not a company’s stock trades 
on a public market. 
Finally, a separate concern surrounding the growth of the secondary 
markets for private company stock is that some perceive it as creating an 
exclusive private stock market for the wealthy. In this vein, finance writer 
Felix Salmon proclaimed, “To invest in younger, smaller companies, you 
increasingly need to be a member of the ultra-rich elite.”311 Small investors 
are shut out from directly investing in these growth companies.312 And 
 
308 The FCPA prohibits bribery of a foreign official, party, or candidate to assist in obtaining 
or retaining business or securing any improper advantage, and requires that public companies keep 
accurate records of transactions and payments and maintain a system of internal controls. 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).  
309 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 235, at 43 (exploring the public–private  
company divide and arguing that “a distinct class of systemically significant public issuers” should 
be created that enjoys a different level of regulation than other issuers); Hillary A. Sale, The New 
“Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 139-40 (2011) (arguing that the definition 
of a corporation as public by reference to whether it trades on a public market is “impoverished” 
and that “the government and the media have increasing influence over public corporations and 
their governance”).  
310 The JOBS Act on-ramp provides that a list of Exchange Act obligations otherwise im-
posed on public companies will not apply until five years after a company’s IPO, unless the 
company either passes $1 billion in annual revenues or reaches a certain market capitalization. 
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101–108, 126 Stat. 306, 307-13 (2012); see also supra note 41.  
311 Salmon, supra note 23; see also Felix Salmon, The Downside of Companies Staying Private, 
REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/03/22/the-downside-of-
companies-staying-private (arguing that limiting investment in private companies creates “a world 
where most companies are owned by a small group of global plutocrats, living off the labor of the 
rest of us”); The Endangered Public Company: Rival Versions of Capitalism, ECONOMIST, May 19, 
2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21555562 (“[P]ublic companies give ordinary 
people a chance to invest directly in capitalism’s most important wealth-creating machines . . . 
The rise of private equity and the spread of private markets are returning power to a club of 
privileged investors.”). 
312 The Facebook IPO provides an interesting example of the media drawing attention to the 
idea that certain wealthy investors and institutions have the opportunity for large gains before the 
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despite the fact that pre-IPO investments are not guaranteed to make 
money, many commentators have predicted that the secondary markets will 
nonetheless continue to exist because “investors have little choice but to 
tread into the private markets if they want to invest in the rapid-growth 
stages of new tech companies.”313 Apart from indirect investments,314 
however, unaccredited retail investors cannot tread into these private 
markets. 
This concern about a stratified market structure is, of course, in tension 
with the investor protection goals that are served by limiting access to the 
private markets in the first place.315 As such, it perhaps serves as a useful 
 
stock is available to the public. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Did Hedge Funds Steal the Facebook IPO 
Pop?, FORBES (May 21, 2012, 2:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/05/21/did-
hedge-funds-steal-the-facebook-ipo-pop (noting that VCs are selling late-stage private company 
stock to hedge funds, private equity firms, and wealthy investors and that the IPO “pop” is a 
“casualty” of companies taking longer to go public); Daniel Gross, Facebook’s IPO Already 
Happened—Several Months Ago on SecondMarket, YAHOO! FIN. (May 21, 2012, 9:44 AM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daniel-gross/facebook-ipo-already-happened-several-months-ago-
secondmarket-134457488.html (“Thanks to SecondMarket, big-shot investors no longer have to 
wait until an IPO to express their enthusiasm about a company. And that means the froth and pop 
that used to take place exclusively on the NASDAQ or the NYSE in the opening trading days can 
now take place weeks or even months before the official IPO. That’s clearly what happened with 
Facebook.”); Derek Thompson, ‘If Facebook’s Profit Model Stays the Same, This Valuation Doesn’t 
Make Any Sense’, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2012/05/if-facebooks-profit-model-stays-the-same-this-valuation-doesnt-make-any-sense/ 
257396/ (“If [you] want something that’s going to have explosive growth, you should have invested 
in Facebook a long time ago [on the secondary market].”).  
313 Joe Light, Facebook: What’s Next for Secondary Markets, WALL ST. J. TOTAL RETURN 
( June 7, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2012/06/07/facebook-whats-next-for-
secondary-markets; see also Tom Foremski, In Facebook IPO Fiasco the ‘Smart Money’ Got Burnt, 
ZDNET (May 25, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/foremski/in-facebook-ipo-fiasco-
the-smart-money-got-burnt/2280 (“The Facebook fiasco . . . should be good news for private stock 
markets such as SharesPost and Second Market [sic] because tech IPOs will be cutback leaving 
these markets in a great position as the only alternative to being acquired.”). 
314 Global Silicon Valley Corp. provides an example of such an indirect investment oppor-
tunity. It is a publicly traded, closed-end mutual fund, which has bought private company stock in 
private secondary transactions. See Tomio Geron, GSV Capital Investment Values Facebook at $70 
Billion, FORBES ( June 27, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2011/06/27/ 
gsv-capital-investment-values-facebook-at-70-billion (noting that the Global Silicon Valley Corp. 
mutual fund included shares of then-private Facebook in its portfolio). 
315 For a similar example of competing values, consider the public reaction to the JOBS Act’s 
“crowdfunding” exemption, which allows for web-based fundraising in relatively small amounts 
from many unaccredited investors. The crowdfunding bill democratized some private company 
investing but came under fire from consumer advocates, media commentators, regulators, and 
academics for eliminating investor protections and potentially fostering fraud. See, e.g., Luis A. 
Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, Public Statement, Investor Protection Is Needed for True Capital Formation: 
Views on the JOBS Act (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2012/spch031612laa.htm (criticizing the JOBS Act and noting consumer advocates and other 
 
  
2012] Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0 241 
 
reminder that as the private secondary markets develop and change, it will 
be important to monitor their relationship to public markets. Furthermore, 
this discussion underscores that proposals for reform, such as this Article’s 
proposal for moderate constraints to respond to information issues, may 
need to be revisited as a balance develops in the broader securities regula-
tion context between public and private markets and companies, and 
between investor protection, market integrity, capital formation, and other 
societal interests.316 
CONCLUSION 
New online marketplaces for secondary trading of private company 
stock may help to increase liquidity at a time when the venture capital 
industry and other investors have struggled with the lengthening time it 
takes start-up companies to go public or be acquired. The new marketplaces 
face significant information issues, however, that threaten their legitimacy 
and efficiency. The goal of this Article is to identify and examine these 
information issues—lack of information, asymmetric information, conflicts 
of interest, and insider trading—as well as provide potential responses that 
would allow the markets to continue to evolve, while promoting their 
integrity and serving investor protection goals. Looking ahead, the devel-
opment of these markets should be followed with interest as they help shape 
the divide between public and private companies and markets.  
 
organizations that had expressed concerns about removing investor protections); Spurring Job 
Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.) (noting 
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Crowdfunding Bill Will It Be?, N.Y. TIMES YOU’RE THE BOSS (Mar. 27, 2012, 1:33 PM), http:// 
boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/which-crowdfunding-bill-will-it-be/ (“The most ballyhooed 
part of the House JOBS bill . . . is the so-called crowdfunding proposal . . . . Opportunities to 
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Salmon, The Problematic JOBS Act, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/ 
felix-salmon/2012/03/21/the-problematic-jobs-act/ (“The crowdfunding (a/k/a crowd-muppeting) 
part, for instance, seems very badly thought out . . . .”). 
316 See Paredes, supra note 178, at 1005 (discussing the delicate balance between regulating for 
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